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INTRODUCTION
The evolution of the Supreme Court's remedial jurisprudence
evinces a quest for the ultimate judicial measure of appropriate relief,
emerging as a norm of remedial proportionality.' The Court's decisions
since 2000 on punitive damages, injunctions, and remedial legislation all
mandate a strict balance and precise measurement in the formulation of
civil remedies. These cases have often fallen below the radar of general
interest or have been ignored for their remedial significance.! However,
these cases demonstrate, somewhat surprisingly, the manner in which the
Court has ventured into the arena of common-law remedies to
unexpectedly alter the foundational principles of crafting remedies. This
Article exposes and critiques the extent to which proportionality
dominates the remedial decisions of the United States Supreme Court in
the new millennium.
"Proportionality" is fast becoming a universal standard of rationality
in the international public law context.3 Indeed, "the concept has
received far more elaboration and evaluation outside of the United
States."4 Proportionality is a general legal principle for avoiding excess
and "reviewing the conformity to the law of any public discretionary
action."5 It is a "yardstick for measuring the appropriate relationship
I. A purist's definition of "remedies" is used here to mean only questions regarding the civil
sanction assessed in the case whether in the form of monetary relief or official directive. Excluded
from the definition of remedy are other legal issues interrelated to remedies, such as immunity, private
rights of action, preemption, and justiciability. See generally Donald H. Zeigler, Rights, Rights of
Action, and Remedies: An Integrated Approach, 76 WASH. L. REV. 67 (2001).
2. See generally The Supreme Court, 2004 Term-Leading Cases, I19 HARV. L. REV. 169 (2005);
Charles H. Whitebread, Going Out with a Whimper: A Term of Tinkering and Fine Tuning, The
Supreme Court's 2004-05 Term, 27 WHIT-IER L. REV. 77 (2005).
3. See Vicki C. Jackson, Being Proportional About Proportionality, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 803,
8o3-04 (2004) (reviewing DAVID M. BEAmrY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAw (2004)); see also D.W. Greig,
Reciprocity, Proportionality, and the Law of Treaties, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 295, 322-23 (1994) (discussing
the role of proportionality in municipal and international law); T. Jeremy Gunn, Deconstructing
Proportionality in Limitations Analysis, i9 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 465, 465-66 (2005) (describing the
increasing importance of proportionality in international jurisprudence); Elisabeth Zoller, Congruence
and Proportionality for Congressional Enforcement Powers: Cosmetic Change or Velvet Revolution?,
78 IND. L.J. 567, 568-69 (2oo3) (discussing international development and acceptance of
proportionality).
4. Jackson, supra note 3, at 803; accord Gunn, supra note 3; Zoller, supra note 3.
5. Zoller, supra note 3, at 581-82.
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between the ends and the means of discretionary action.",6 International
jurists use proportionality to evaluate the extent to which government
intrudes on the paramount individual rights of citizens. However,
American legal scholars have not embraced the advent of this new test
because it "sounds unfamiliar, dangerous for the protection of civil
rights, and illustrative of the conservatism of the Court.,8 These fears
appear well-founded as the Supreme Court has co-opted proportionality
as its own standard for protecting governmental and corporate interests
against the individual plaintiff.
This Article begins by taking a positivist view to describe how the
Court has utilized proportionality in its remedial decisions. It first
explains the Court's theory of remedial essentialism, which forms the
foundation for the rule of remedial proportionality. The theory of
remedial essentialism formalistically separates the remedy from the right,
and it is this binary concept that establishes the premise of balance
inherent in proportionality. This notion of balance or equilibrium draws
on theories from Aristotle and law and economics mandating remedial
balance as a proxy for justice. Practically speaking, the rule of
proportionality engages the court in a type of "Three Bears" analysis
under which it evaluates whether the remedy is too big, too small, or just
right. The Article synthesizes the most recent Supreme Court cases on
remedies to flesh out the principles of proportionality driving the Court's
decisions. These remedial decisions emanate from a wide variety of
factual contexts, including abortion, water rights, insurance, patents, and
tribal immunity. Yet, the decisions coalesce in transsubstantive fashion
around the assumed foundational truth of remedial proportionality as
the ultimate measure of civil justice.
After tracing the development of strict proportionality in the
Supreme Court, the Article engages in a normative analysis to evaluate
whether proportionality should in fact be the guiding principle of
remedies law. It begins with the identification of the Court's justifications
for the rule. The Court seems to value proportionality for its rationality
and objectivity, judicial restraint and minimalism, and reciprocal
response. However, the Article reveals these claims of rationality,
restraint, and reciprocity as myths. Proportionality is not an objective
standard. Continued reliance upon these myths creates significant legal
dangers by obscuring the subjective framing issues inherent in a rule of
comparison and undue deference to the interests of the wrongdoers.
6. Id. at 582.
7. Jackson supra note 3, at 804; see also R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.R. 103.
8. Zoller, supra note 3, at 568. "From a comparative law perspective, however, the new test is
not as bad as it sounds.... [l]t introduces into American constitutional law a standard of judicial
review that has proved to be useful in many continental European countries in enhancing judicial
protection of civil rights." Id.
November 2007]
HASTINGS LA WJOURNAL
When the rule of proportionality is deconstructed, it becomes apparent
that proportionality is not a rule of restraint, but rather one of activism.
The Article ultimately rejects the continued use of remedial
proportionality and its fostering of judicial activism by the highest Court.
Instead, it recommends a return to the traditional judicial review of
remedies deferring to the initial fact finders in each case.
I. PROPORTIONALITY AS REMEDIAL EQUILIBRIUM
In the Supreme Court's recent remedial decisions, the Court appears
to be searching for the perfect measure of relief in each case. The series
of important remedial decisions reveals that the Court has seized upon
proportionality as its foundational principle of objectivity to resolve
questions of remedy.' The Court has not articulated its reasons for the
adoption of proportionality as the governing principle nor explored its
theoretical underpinnings. Reading between the lines, the Court (except
for Justice Scalia) seems to view the proportionality rule as an objective
rule that can consistently enforce the norm of fairness in crafting judicial
remedies. The Court assumes it has adopted a neutral principle of law
that constrains the power of judicial interpretation. This formalistic and
mechanical rule of law now appears to be the governing principle upon
which most of the Court's remedial decisions will be based.
A. REMEDIAL ESSENTIALISM
Remedial essentialism, the theoretical premise that a remedy is
conceptually isolated from the underlying substantive right, is the
necessary predicate to the Court's principle of remedial proportionality.
This formalistic separation of remedy from right provides the foundation
for proportionality, for without two separate interests, the notion of
balancing carries little meaning.
The Court's legal formalism depicts rights as primary and remedies
as secondary." A primary right is a legal duty, guarantee, or expectation,
whereas the remedial right is the consequence or sanction following non-
compliance with the primary right." "Rights essentialism" isolates the
core legal principle of right from the translation of that right through
facts and policy in the real world. 2 For judges, this means that remedial
9. Marci A. Hamilton & David Schoenbrod, The Reaffirmation of Proportionality Analysis
Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 469,469-79 (1999).
1o. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 122-34 (William M. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994)
(discussing dichotomy between primary and remedial rights); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 89-
96 (1961) (distinguishing between primary rights of substantive claim and secondary rights of remedy).
I I. Tracy A. Thomas, Congress' Section 5 Power and Remedial Rights, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 673,
683 (2001).




decisions imposing tangible consequences for the right leave the right
inviolate rather than diminished or enhanced by the practical reality. 3
Rights essentialism establishes a binary concept of right and remedy that
subordinates remedies to the more valuable core legal value. In other
words, "rights and remedies are made of different stuff-and the rights
stuff is better."' 4 Remedial essentialism is the necessary corollary that
segregates the inferior remedy in judicial decisionmaking to immunize
the right.
Examples of remedial essentialism are apparent throughout the
Court's jurisprudence. Take, for example, the Court's 2006 decision in
Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England.'5 In Ayotte,
New Hampshire appealed the invalidation of its Parental Notification
Prior to Abortion Act, which the lower courts struck down in its entirety
due to the absence of a medical emergency exception. 6 Justice
O'Connor, writing for a unanimous Court, repeatedly stated that the
decision was simply a "question of remedy" and not one of legal rights. 7
In the decision's opening line, she emphasized: "We do not revisit our
abortion precedents today, but rather address a question of remedy.'
8
The Court went on to vacate the invalidation of the abortion statute,
holding that "invalidating a statute entirely is not always necessary or
justified, for lower courts may be able to render narrow declaratory and
injunctive relief."'9 Thus, the Court asserted that as a remedial decision,
the Ayotte opinion had no impact upon its abortion jurisprudence."
The Court's essentialist view of remedies is also seen in City of
13. Id. at 9oo (arguing that normative theories about constitutional rights should not be separated
from the positive realities of their remedial enforcement).
14. Id. at 858; see also Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 678 (1983)
(describing the right/remedy distinction in constitutional law as "[plure rights, dirty remedies").
15. 546 U.S. 320 (2006).
16. Id. at 324-25.
17. Id. at 323, 328; see also Linda Greenhouse, Court Walks Fine Line on Teenage Abortions,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. i9, 2006, at 2 ("The studiously bland io-page opinion carefully sidestepped
the abortion debate that has been such a prominent feature of public discourse about the Court's
future.").
18. Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 323; see Tony Mauro, High Court Sidesteps Dispute Over Parental
Notification for Abortion, N.J. L.J., Jan. 23, 2006, at 197 (stating that Justice O'Connor avoided a
major showdown on abortion rights in her valedictory writing which was based on the narrower
remedial ground).
19. Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 323.
20. Id. However, as the Court admitted, this holding does in fact revisit past precedents by
contradicting the decision in Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930 (2000), invalidating an abortion
statute in its entirety. Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 330-31; see also Note, After Ayotte: The Need to Defend
Abortion Rights with Renewed "Purpose," I19 HARV. L. REV. 2552, 2552 (2006) (noting that courts
have traditionally used a broad, facial invalidation remedy for unconstitutional abortion statutes, but
that Ayotte suggests the Court may be rethinking their approach as to the function that broad abortion
remedies have served); Mauro, supra note 18 (quoting opinion that Ayotte "can be read as almost an




Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation.' In Sherrill, the Court explicitly
emphasized that the right is very different from the remedy: "'The
substantive questions whether the plaintiff has any right or the defendant
any duty, and if so what it is, are very different questions from the
remedial questions whether this remedy or that is preferred, and what
the measure of the remedy is ..... The Sherrill Court reiterated the right
of the Oneida tribe to ownership of ancient tribal lands it had purchased
on the open market, but applied the remedial doctrine of laches to deny
the requested declaratory and injunctive relief exempting the tribal
owners from county taxes. 3 The Court raised the remedial issue sua
sponte and decided the case under "standards of federal equity practice,"
refusing to consider the substantive questions of tax immunity and
definitions of "Indian country" decided below and argued by the
parties.' The eight-Justice majority 5 rested its decision solidly upon the
distinction between right and remedy: the tribe had a "right" to tribal
property ownership, but no remedial mechanism to enforce that right
prospectively. 
6
Again, in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L. C., the Court held that "a
right is distinct from the provision of remedies for violations of that
right." 7 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that a patent
holder's right to exclude competitors from practicing an invention was
21. 544 U.S. 197 (2005).
22. Id. at 213 (quoting D. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 1.2, at 3 (973)).
23. Id. at 216-17. Laches is an equitable defense that bars a remedy when plaintiffs have
unreasonably delayed in prosecuting the action causing prejudice to the other side. DOBBS, supra note
22. Here, the Court said that the long lapse of time (2oo years) during which the Oneidas did not seek
to revive their sovereign control through equitable relief in court, and the dramatic changes in the
character of the property from reservation to city during that time precluded the tribe "from gaining
the disruptive remedy it now seeks." Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 217.
24. Id. at 214 n.8. While the Court claimed that its remedial decision did not address the
underlying substantive rights, the precedential effect of the case has been to the contrary. See Amy
Borgman, Note, Stamping Out the Embers of Tribal Sovereignty: City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian
Nation and Its Aftermath, io GREAT PILINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 59, 6o (2oo6) ("Sherrill has dramatically
altered the legal landscape against which courts will consider tribes' claims.... [T]he message is clear:
the American Court system will no longer sympathize with tribes seeking retribution for past
wrongs."); The Supreme Court, 2004 Term-Leading Cases, supra note 2, at 348 (arguing that the
Court correctly ruled given its inability to adjudicate the type of reparative justice claim raised by the
Indians that is properly left to the political branches).
25. Justice Stevens dissented on grounds that the Court's decision could not be squared with its
prior decision authorizing damages for the same claim, stating that the "Court's reliance on the
distinctions between law and equity and between substantive rights and remedies is indefensible."
Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 226 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). He also challenged the Court's use
of laches to resolve the case since the issue had not been briefed and the tribe could avoid the
equitable defense of laches by reasserting their claim for immunity as a defense in a state tax collection
action. Id. at 224-26.
26. Id. at 221 (majority opinion). On remand, the district court held that New York state law
precludes county taxation of property owned by Indian tribes. Oneida Indian Nation v. Madison
County, 40 F. Supp. 2d 219, 232 (N.D.N.Y. 2005).
27. 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1840 (2006).
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sufficiently strong to merit a presumption of qualifying for an injunction
in every case." This categorical rule altered the common-law principle of
injunctive relief, which requires a showing of the inadequacy of plaintiff's
monetary remedies and a balancing of hardships between the parties,
court, and public." In reversing the Federal Circuit's remedial decision, a
unanimous Supreme Court disaggregated right from remedy in the
patent context and remanded the decision with clear instructions that the
right not dictate the appropriate balance for equitable relief.30 In other
words, the injunctive remedy is an absolute legal principle which should
not be diluted by the interaction with the attendant legal right.
This right/remedy dichotomy has been criticized by scholars, who
have illustrated how the measure or enforcement of a remedy, or lack
thereof, significantly alters the effective meaning of the substantive legal
right.3' The American legal realists emphasized that it was erroneous to
view a legal right abstracted from the remedy available in the legal
system.32 "As form cannot always be separated from substance in a work
of art, so adjective or remedial aspects cannot be parted entirely from
substantive ones . . . ." For example, a contractual promise is only as
good as the remedy that backs it up; if the law sustains an efficient
breach, a contracting party is not in fact required to honor his legal
promise.'
Scholars have thus criticized the overly formalistic conceptualization
of rights that minimizes the importance of remedies and masks the effect
of remedial decisions. Professor Levinson articulated how the "deeply
28. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
29. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1841.
30. Id. at 1840. Similarly, in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 764 (2o07), the Court,
in an opinion joined by all of the Justices except Justice Thomas, overturned the Federal Circuit's
attempt to carve out a special rule of declaratory relief in patent cases. The Federal Circuit denied
jurisdiction on a declaratory judgment claim where the party to the patent licensing agreement had not
yet breached the agreement. Id. at 768. The Court reaffirmed the rule that a party need not subject
itself to penalty prior to seeking declaratory relief. Id. at 772.
31. David Cole, The Value of Seeing Things Differently: Boerne v. Flores and Congressional
Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 1997 Sup. Cr. REV. 35, 66 (discussing the "inextricable relationship"
between right and remedy in the context of congressional remedies for immigration under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment); Barry Friedman, When Rights Encounter Reality: Enforcing Federal
Remedies, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 735, 739 (1992) (viewing constitutional rights through the prism of
remedies); Levinson, supra note 12 (arguing that normative theories of constitutional rights cannot be
separated from realities of remedial enforcement); Thomas, supra note 1 I, at 687-88 (arguing for the
"unified right theory" of remedies in which the remedy and its definitional guarantee are two
components of one unified whole).
32. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 31, at 735-36; Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About
Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1244 (193).
33. Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 116 (1945) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
34. LON L. FULLER & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 205--08 (5th ed. 199o);
Thomas, supra note I 1, at 693.
35. See Friedman, supra note 31, at 738; Levinson, supra note i2; Thomas, supra note II; Zeigler,
supra note I, at 69.
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embedded" and "deeply misleading" theory of rights essentialism
provides an "oversimplified picture of the relationship between rights
and remedies. ' '36 Instead, Levinson and others have demonstrated how
remedies are functionally related and inextricably intertwined with
rights.37 Remedies are the practical, real, and functional component that
actualizes the right and makes it operational between the parties."
Despite this academic insight, the Court seems mired in the
formalistic belief that remedies are isolated legal concepts that should be
adjudicated apart from the connected substantive right. Adopting a
modernist philosophy, the Court has constructed an allegedly objective
rule of proportionality to reconcile the binary right/remedy construct and
constrain the power of judicial interpretation.39 This foundational
assumption of remedial essentialism effectively minimizes the
significance of the Court's remedial decisions by subordinating the
ancillary remedy to the important foundational right.4'
It is the binary thinking of remedial essentialism that makes
proportionality possible as a formalist rule. However, it is also this
essentialist thinking that begins the Court's detour in the jurisprudence
of remedies.
B. A BALANCED MEASURE OF JUSTICE
"Proportionality" is most easily understood to be a standard that
requires the judicial sanction to "fit" the legal harm.4' While no clear
definition of proportionality emerges from the Supreme Court cases, the
basic meaning is balance or equilibrium." Proportionality addresses the
36. Levinson, supra note 12.
37. See id.; Friedman, supra note 3I, at 735-36; Gewirtz, supra note 14, at 678-79; Thomas, supra
note I1, at 687-88; Donald Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the Enforcement of
Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 665, 665-66 (1987).
38. Thomas, supra note I , at 687-88.
39. Cf. GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S
END 3, 5-6, 41 (1995) (describing the tenets of legal modernism as belief in rules of law that embody
universal truths, core essences, and foundational theories that provide for objective and consistent
decisionmaking to discover the "right answers" in every case).
40. Following the formalist remedial binary and ignoring the unified nature of right and remedy
leads to difficult decisions. For example, in the case of Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748
(2005), the Court misdiagnosed a case involving the failure to enforce a remedy as a case of
substantive right. The plaintiff sought damages under the Due Process Clause for the police
department's repeated failure to enforce a restraining order against her husband. Id. at 754. The
failure ultimately led to her ex-husband's horrific murder of their three children. Id. In divorcing right
from remedy, the Court was able to avoid addressing the impotence of an abstract right.
41. Gunn, supra note 3, at 466.
42. See Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth
Amendment: "Proportionality" Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REv. 571, 573-74 (2005) ("Indeed, no
clear definition of proportionality can be found in any of the Court's noncapital cases."); Gunn, supra
note 3, at 468 ("It is a peculiar characteristic of legal systems to adopt single words, e.g.
'proportionality'... to encapsulate core values with broad implications but whose actual meanings can
[V0l. 59:73
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measure, degree, or magnitude of the remedy and prohibits extreme
measures that do not fit the harm. 3 Metaphorically, proportionality holds
that "one should not use a sledge hammer to crack a nut when a
nutcracker will suffice."' As explained in the Magna Carta, "[a] free man
shall not be amerced [penalized] for a trivial offence, except in
accordance with the degree of the offence; and for a serious offence he
shall be amerced according to its gravity."45 The same concept appears
even earlier in the Code of Hammurabi and the Old Testament as the
principle of lex talionis-an eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth.46
Proportionality thus seeks the perfect balance between right and remedy.
In the remedial context, proportionality generally is applied in a
mechanical way to require that a judicial remedy be properly related in
size or degree to the wrong. The decisionmaker searches for the precise
balance between the defendant's harm and the plaintiff's remedy in
order to avoid excess, gain, or windfall on either side. Equilibrium thus
emerges as the hallmark of proportionality, evoking visions of the
balanced scales of justice.47 As Justice Scalia so aptly noted, it is the
balanced scale, and not the seesaw, that has come to serve as the icon of
neutral and rational decisionmaking. 48
Proportionality analysis at times resembles cost-benefit analysis,
whereby the court weighs the benefits and burdens between the parties.
In this utilitarian sense, proportionality searches for a proper fit or
relationship between ends and means.49 Costs and benefits are weighed
by considering the gravity of the harm and the alternative governmental
responses." A governmental measure may be disproportionate in a
utilitarian sense when the measure's costs and burdens outweigh the
likely benefits or when the measure is more burdensome than some
be maddeningly vague and even incoherent."); Zoller, supra note 3, at 580.
43. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575, 596, 6oo (1996) (discussing the
proportionality standard as an assessment of the proper degree and measure of punitive damages);
TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 478 (I993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing a
case from 1813 requiring a moderate remedy "proper to the magnitude and manner of that offence").
44. Gunn, supra note 3, at 466-67; see also Zoller, supra note 3, at 58o & n.76 (noting the
nutcracker metaphor of proportionality in the British courts and the cannon metaphor from a Swiss
jurist: "You must not shoot sparrows with cannons").
45. MAGNA CARTA, Ch. 2o (James Clarke Holt, trans., 2d ed. 1992) (1215).
46. See infra text accompanying notes 365-68.
47. See Alice Ristroph, Proportionality as a Principle of Limited Government, 55 DUKE L.J. 263,
280 (2005) ("'But what kind and what degree of punishment does justice take as its principle and its
norm? None other than the principle of equality in the movement of the pointer on the scales of
justice."' (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, reprinted in KANT: POLITCAL
WR rINGS 131, i55 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 2d ed. i995))).
48. Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 766-67 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring).
49. See Frase, supra note 42, at 592-97. Utilitarianism searches for the greatest happiness for the
greatest number, and thus will balance to incorporate the interests of all concerned. See Ristroph,
supra note 47, at 272.
50. See Frase, supra note 42, at 593-96.
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alternative means." However, proportionality is a standard of judicial
review "that is more elaborate and sophisticated, but also more intrusive
and aggressive, than the traditional means-end test."5 Thus, it may
consider "a range of other issues like federalism, institutional
competencies, and the appropriateness of judicial deference to other
institutions. 53
Theoretical notions of balance as justice are evident in legal theories
ranging from the very earliest to the most recent of times. Justice, as
envisioned by both Aristotle and law and economics theorists, focuses on
balance as a proxy for fairness and appropriate judicial action. Aristotle
considered justice as a concept of balance between the extremes of
excess and deficiency that equalizes the positions of the parties. 4
Equality between the parties is determined by a "mean," or intermediate
state, which lies between the extreme vices of deficiencies and excess.
"[J]ustice is a certain kind of mean condition,... concerned with a mean
quantity, while injustice is concerned with extreme quantities.", 6 Justice
is thereby portrayed as a norm of fairness achieved through a
mathematical function. 7 "[W]hat is just in transactions is something
equitable, . . . according to an arithmetic proportion."" Justice is
accomplished by finding the right mean between gain and loss that
achieves an arithmetic ratio of one to one.59 This arithmetic ratio of
justice requires the judge to "even things up" by adjusting unbalanced
gain and loss into equal halves.6° "[W]henever neither more nor less
results," each party has what is justly theirs.6 ' Thus, Aristotle's
philosophy focuses on striking a careful balance and equilibrium between
the parties to achieve justice. Excess or gain to either side is considered
the antithesis of a just or fair result.62
Aristotle's vision of corrective justice as a restoration of proportion
between parties after a wrong is one justification offered in support of
51. Id. at 592-93.
52. Zoller, supra note 3, at 571.
53. Gunn, supra note 3, at 467.
54. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book V, Ch. 5, at 88-91 (Joe Sachs trans., 2002); see Sarah
M.R. Cravens, Judges as Trustees: A Duty to Account and an Opportunity for Virtue, 62 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1637, 1642 (2005).
55. ARISTOTLE, supra note 54, at 9o-9I; see Ernst J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV.
403,404-05 (1992)-
56. ARISTOTLE, supra note 54, at 9o-91 ("And injustice is the opposite in relation to what is unjust,
and this is excess and deficiency of what is beneficial or harmful, contrary to proportion.").
57. Id. at 86-87; see Weinrib, supra note 55, at 404 ("In Aristotle's account, fairness as a norm is
inseparable from equality as a mathematical function.").
58. ARISTOTLE, supra note 54, at 86.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 87.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 90-9 I.
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the proportionality rule in the area of compensatory damages."
"Corrective justice theory is based on a simple and elegant idea: when
one person has been wrongfully injured by another, the injurer must
make the injured party whole." 64 The corrective justice principle of
equilibrium, sometimes referred to as the "rightful position," requires
that damages return the plaintiff to the position she would have been in
but for the harm.6' To do less would leave part of the harm unremedied,
whereas doing more would confer a windfall gain to the plaintiff.6 The
bipolarity of corrective justice requires that "[t]he defendant must pay
not just any amount, but the amount of the plaintiff's injury, because the
payment is not a penalty per se, but the rectification of an injury that the
defendant inflicted." 67
Theoretical support for a proportionality rule of remedies is also
found in modern law and economics. The Coase Theorem reduces the
question of balance to a level of bargaining between the parties.6 Parties
should bargain freely to resolve legal disputes based on economic
efficiency. A rule of precise remedial measurement creates incentives for
defendants to act efficiently. The basic principle is that to achieve
appropriate remedial goals, "injurers should be made to pay for the harm
their conduct generates, not less, not more."' If the remedy is "lower or
higher than the harm, various socially undesirable consequences will
result. ,,7O
If injurers pay less than for the harm they cause, underdeterrence may
result-that is, precautions may be inadequate, product prices may be
too low, and risk-producing activities may be excessive. Conversely, if
injurers are made to pay more than for the harm they cause, wasteful
precautions may be taken, product prices may be inappropriately high,
and risky but socially beneficial activities may be undesirably curtailed.
Thus, the law should seek a perfect balance between parties to achieve
economic efficiency.7
Balancing to achieve economic efficiency operates similarly in the
context of preliminary injunctions. "The traditional preliminary
injunction rule employs a balancing of irreparable harms designed to
minimize expected error costs."72 The court compares "the harm to
63. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 17 (3d ed. 2002).
64. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695,695 (2003).
65. LAYCOCK, supra note 63.
66. Id.
67. Zipursky, supra note 64, at 701.
68. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. I (I96o); see also RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 56-58 (5th ed. 1998).
69. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV.
L. REV. 869,873 (1998).
70. Id. at 878.
71. Id. at 873; see also POSNER, supra note 68, at 197-99.
72. Richard R.W. Brooks & Warren F. Schwartz, Legal Uncertainty, Economic Efficiency, and the
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plaintiff if preliminary relief is erroneously denied and the harm to
defendant if preliminary relief is erroneously granted."73 If there is an
excess of harm to plaintiff, the preliminary injunction will be granted.
Prior to the entry of a final judgment, "individual incentives to behave
efficiently are distorted by uncertain legal entitlements."74 When rights
are uncertain, parties discount the harm caused to others.75 Preliminary
injunctions correct this distortion by counteracting the bias toward
infringement: realigning the balance to promote efficiency. 6
Proportionality or equivalence between the parties under the law creates
the proper incentives for parties to operate efficiently and economically.
C. THE THREE BEARS THEORY OF REDRESS
The proportionality principle of remedies and its search for balance
can be thought of as the "Three Bears" theory of redress: the proper
remedy is that which is not too big, not too small, but just right. Like
Goldilocks searching for the perfect bowl of porridge, courts search for
the perfect remedy by trying out different remedial choices. This version
of proportionality resonates with the Supreme Court, which has utilized
it as the guiding principle in deciding remedial questions over the past
five years.
For example, in Kansas v. Colorado, Justices Thomas and Stevens
used Three Bears language to describe their differing views regarding the
proper measure of damages computed as prejudgment interest.7 7 The
case, on its fourth appeal to the Court, involved Colorado's breach of the
Arkansas River Compact beginning in 195o, and the proper
determination of the principal upon which prejudgment interest would
be computed. 5 In a prior appeal, "Colorado attacked the award of any
prejudgment interest, while Kansas called for full prejudgment
interest."79 The Court adopted the special master's equitable approach,
awarding prejudgment interest beginning in 1985, when Colorado first
filed its complaint." Kansas then sought post-1985 interest computed
upon all damages since 1950, which the Court dismissed as an attempt to
convert a "modest adjustment" of prejudgment interest into a windfall to
Preliminary Injunction Doctrine, 58 STAN. L. REV. 381, 396 (2005).
73. Id.; accord John Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525,
541 (978).
74. Brooks & Schwartz, supra note 72, at 382.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 393-94.
77. 543 U.S. 86, to6-io (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment,
and Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
78. Id. at 90-92 (majority opinion).
79. Id. at 96; see also Kansas v. Colorado, 533 U.S. I, 9-12 (2001).
80. 543 U.S. at 96.
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the plaintiff.8 ' The majority thus held that prejudgment interest applied
82only to damages incurred after 1985. Justice Stevens dissented, stating
that "the fact that Kansas' request represents too large a measure of
damages does not convince me that Kansas is entitled to no interest for
damages prior to I985." ' Justice Thomas, in a concurrence, criticized the
Court for its "equitable compromise" of the past that created the further
uncertainty in the pending case: "The Court therefore must again decide
what is too little or too much compensation for Colorado's depletion of
the Arkansas." '
Justice Thomas utilized Three Bears reasoning again, this time
writing for the Court, in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.85 In eBay,
the Court overturned a permanent injunction issued by the Federal
Circuit to protect a business-method patent that defendant, eBay, had
infringed upon its successful auction website.&6 The Court was concerned
that each party sought extreme positions as plaintiffs argued patentees
were always entitled to equitable relief in addition to damages, and
defendants argued injunctions were never appropriate. 8' Thomas
criticized the appellate court for granting too much relief by establishing
a categorical rule under which patent holders were always entitled to an
injunction.' He also chastised the district court for erring "in the
opposite direction" by awarding too little relief by holding that business
method patentees never need an injunction because they could always
remedy their loss with damages.89 The Supreme Court in eBay thus
eschewed the "broad classifications" and "expansive principles" at the
far ends of the remedial spectrum, reiterating the importance of balance
between interests as necessary to determining the remedy that is just
right in each case.'
8i. Id. at 98. Kansas' argument would have converted the $38 million damages into an award of
$53 million. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at io9 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Stevens would have
computed interest from 1969 forward, representing the time Colorado knew, or should have known, it
was violating the compact. Id. at I Io.
84. Id. at IO6-O7 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (emphasis
added). Justice Thomas thought that no prejudgment interest should be available because neither the
contract nor the common law at the time of the contract formation authorized such relief. Id.
85. 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
86. Id. at 1839.
87. Id. at 1837.
88. Id. at 1841. The American Bar Association in its amicus brief in eBay asked the high court to
uphold the Federal Circuit's automatic rule for injunctions. See Steve Seidenberg, Troll Control,
A.B.A. J., Sept. 2006, at 51, 53.
89. eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1840.
9
o . Id. at 184O-41. However, the remaining Justices indicated in two separate concurrences that
they differed on how that balance should be applied in the case. Chief Justice Roberts thought the
balance tipped in favor of the patent holders. Id. at 1841-42 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). Justice
Kennedy thought the balance was in favor of the company commercializing the process. Id. at 1842
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Three Bears reasoning appeared more subtly in the Court's analysis
of equitable restitution.9 In Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v.
Knudson, the Court, in a five to four decision, limited the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act's statutory authorization of "equitable"
relief to claims for constructive trust and equitable lien.92 Justice Scalia,
writing for the majority, used a historical approach to interpret
"equitable" in the text of the federal benefits statute to include only
those equitable remedies typically available in equity during the days of
the divided bench.93 The effect of this decision was to preclude
reimbursement to the company from its insured for funds advanced for
medical treatment and then later recovered by the insured from a third-
party tortfeasor.94 Scalia was not moved by pleas from the insurance
company that his narrow historical rule left plan providers with too little
relief.95 Due to the operation of federal preemption laws, the insurance
company would be left with no alternative remedy under state law, thus
making standard insurance subrogation clauses practically
unenforceable. 9 The Court's restriction on the statutory remedial power
was motivated by the perception that the plaintiff insurance company
was overreaching by arguing for a definition of "equitable" relief that
acted as a catchall provision for all monetary relief.' Justice Stevens, on
the other hand, criticized the majority's "current reluctance to conclude
that wrongs should be remedied."8
(Kennedy, J., concurring). For more on the eBay concurrences see infra text accompanying notes 221-
26.
91. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
92. Id. at 214. Justice Scalia admitted that "our cases have not previously drawn this fine
distinction between restitution at law and restitution in equity." Id.
93. Id. at 210-12. See generally John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by "Equitable": The
Supreme Court's Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317 (2003)
(arguing that Congress intended ERISA to incorporate the long history of trust remedy law
authorizing reimbursement actions); Colleen P. Murphy, Misclassifying Monetary Restitution, 55 SMU
L. REv. 1577, 1616-23 (2002) (arguing that the Court incorrectly classified the relief requested as
restitution, misread historical practice, and suggesting that a claim for specific money in defendant's
possession like Great-West brought was always equitable restitution); Tracy A. Thomas, Justice Scalia
Reinvents Restitution, 36 Lo'. L.A. L. REV. lO63 (2003) (criticizing Scalia's historical approach and
creation of an unworkable standard).
94. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 208-09.
95. Id. at 220.
96. Id. at 220-21; see also Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court's Judicial Passivity, 2002 SUp. Cr.
REV. 343, 347-48 ("Some may not be greatly concerned about the inability of a benefits plan to
enforce its right to subrogation against a woman left quadriplegic by a serious accident. But as a result
of this decision, benefit plans under ERISA may in the future be reluctant to make payments to
injured individuals because of the uncertainty that subrogation rights will be enforceable.").
97. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 210.
98. Id. at 223 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg also dissented (joined by Justices Stevens,
Souter, and Breyer) criticizing the majority for its "antiquarian inquiry" that needlessly obscured the
meaning and application of the statute and which was "better left to the legal historians." Id. at 233-34
(citation omitted). Four years later, a unanimous Court in Sereboff v. Mid-Atlantic Medical Services,
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These cases thus demonstrate the machinations of balance inherent
in the proportionality standard. The proportionality rule seeks a precise
balance between the right and remedy as a proxy for fairness and justice.
Applying this rule consistently and clearly, however, has proved elusive.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF REMEDIAL PROPORTIONALITY
A journey through the Supreme Court's decisions since 2000 reveals
a mishmash of cases on remedies. These cases, addressing punitive
damages, injunctions, and legislative remedies, share a governing rule of
proportionality, which the Court applies to curtail the remedies available
to courts and petitioners.' As Professor Andrew Siegel has noted, "the
Court's ire falls indiscriminately on those advocating for the availability
of a remedy."'"° This section explores the Court's reasoning in remedial
proportionality decisions and synthesizes the opinions to reveal the
common principles guiding proportionality analysis.
As initially applied by the Court, remedial proportionality was an
outer limit used to guard against extreme remedial measures or gross
disproportionality."'' This gross excessiveness standard was a variant of
the "I know it when I see it" or "shocks the judicial conscience" tests
used to catch extreme remedial outliers.' 2 In Pacific Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Haslip, the Court's first foray into federal substantive
review of state punitive awards, it applied a "gentle rule" of common-law
reasonableness to uphold a punitive award 200 times the amount of
pecuniary damages."'3 The Court held that the award did not "cross the
line into the area of constitutional impropriety" because state law
assured the jury award was not grossly disproportionate to the severity of
the offense or the compensatory damages. 4 Under this "weak" remedial
proportionality standard, the Court intervened sparingly to keep a check
on excessive remedies, but otherwise gave due deference to the
Inc., quietly reversed positions and granted the insurance company the right to seek reimbursement.
126 S. Ct. 1869 (2oo6). In a technical opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court authorized
reimbursement for most insurance companies by labeling the subrogation action as one for "equitable
lien." Id. at 1875. The Sereboff Court did not address the conflict with its prior holding in Department
of the Army v. Blue Fox, 525 U.S. 255, 263-65 (i999), that equitable liens are essentially actions for
money and thus are "legal" rather than equitable claims. See Thomas, supra note 93, at 1074
(addressing the inconsistency between Great-West and Blue Fox).
99. Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing
Theme in the Rehnquist Court's Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1115-17 (2006).
oo. Id. at 1125-26.
toI. See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 478-80 (1993).
102. See Pamela S. Karlan, "Pricking the Lines": The Due Process Clause, Punitive Damages, and
Criminal Punishment, 88 MINN. L. REV. 880, 903 (2004).
103. 499 U.S. I, 2o (i99I). In Haslip, the insureds sued their insurance company for the fraud of its
agent in pocketing payments for insurance that had lapsed. Id. at i. The lead plaintiff, Haslip,
recovered compensatory damages of $200,ooo, including $4,000 of pecuniary damages for out-of-
pocket losses for uninsured medical bills. Id. at 23-24.
104. Id. at 24.
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decisionmaker's expertise and experience. Judicial review of remedies
looked only for extreme disproportionality that pushed the limits of legal
redress."
In contrast, the proportionality standard of the modern Court has
emerged as a heightened standard of judicial review that demands
conformity to a precise remedial measurement. Rather than cursory
oversight to catch excessive remedies at the periphery of reasonableness,
modern proportionality affirmatively requires reviewing courts to
demand a more exact remedial fit. Borrowing from the Court's
terminology in criminal punishment cases, this heightened review might
be labeled "strict proportionality" in that it demands a close fit between
harm and remedy. The remedial strict proportionality test requires a
close nexus in both method and magnitude between the governmental
remedial action and operative legal right. That is, the court's remedy
must correspond to the right in both type (method or subject) and
amount (magnitude or scope).
An early example of the development of the Court's remedial
proportionality principle can be seen in City of Riverside v. Rivera. ' In
Rivera, the plurality and the concurring Justice Powell explicitly adopted
a proportionality standard for assessing the reasonableness of attorney's
fees in civil rights cases, requiring that fees be proportionate to the
results obtained in the case." This fee standard evaluates the magnitude
of the success, including equitable relief, and furtherance of the "public
interest" in balancing the reasonableness of the fees.'8 Applying the
standard, the Court upheld a fee award of $245,456.25 in Rivera where
the plaintiffs obtained only $33,350 in compensatory and punitive
damages I" because the successful race discrimination claim against the
police department advanced the public interest sufficiently to justify the
105. Karlan, supraz note 1O2; see, e.g., TXO, 509 U.S. at 446-66; Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18; St. Louis,
Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 67 (t9i9); Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212
U.S. 86, ill (19o9).
lo6. 477 U.S. 561 (1986).
107. Id. at 564-86; see also Thomas H. McDonough, Recent Decisions: Civil Rights- Third Circuit
Disallows Use of Proportionality Analysis in Awarding Attorney's Fees Pursuant to the Federal Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 449, 468 (1998).
Io8. Rivera, 477 U.S. at 564-8r. A similar standard appears in the Prison Litigation Reform Act of
1995 ("PLRA"), which requires that attorney's fees be proportionate to the "court ordered relief" in
the case. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1)(B)(i) (2000). The PLRA thus eliminates from the proportionality
rule consideration of the advancement of the public interest, otherwise permitted by Rivera, and
removes consideration of success derived from private settlements. See Lynn S. Branham, Toothless In
Truth? The Ethereal Rational Basis Test and The Prison Litigation Reform Act's Disparate Restrictions
on Attorney's Fees, 89 CAL. L. REv. 999, 1010-I (2OOI).
109. 477 U.S. at 564-8I. But see id. at 587 (Burger, J., dissenting) ("[I]t would be difficult to find a
better example of legal nonsense than the fixing of attorney's fees by a judge at $245,456.25 for the
recovery of $33,35o damages.").
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award."' Five Justices expressly rejected the defendants' request for a
strict mathematical proportionality formula that would have limited fees
to $ I OO, 33% of the monetary recovery."' The Court held that while it
was concerned about potential windfalls to plaintiffs' attorneys, there
were adequate safeguards in place to protect against such excess."2 Thus,
while the Court rejected a strict proportionality standard demanding a
close fit between fees and relief, it also moved away from a weak review
of gross excessiveness advanced by the plaintiffs. The Court thus began
to demand heightened judicial oversight measuring the scope of relief.
Reviewing the most recent Supreme Court cases on remedies
demonstrates to a striking degree how the Court has converted
proportionality from a limited rule of thumb to a universal standard of
remedial measurement. The following section traces the evolution of the
proportionality standard through the Court's most recent
pronouncements.
A. MATHEMATICAL PROPORTIONALITY IN PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Over the last decade, the Supreme Court has been newly troubled
by state court awards of punitive damages, finding them, in classic Three
Bears fashion, to be simply just "too big.""..3 Punitive damages are a
discretionary monetary remedy imposed to punish a defendant's
unlawful conduct and to deter its repetition."4 The Court has expressed
concerns with "monstrous awards""' 5 of punitive damages that "run
wild""' 6 or are "skyrocketing.""... The Court is suspicious of state juries
IIO. Id. at 564-81 (plurality opinion). However, Justice Powell, the concurring, fifth Justice in the
case, opined that:
Where recovery of private damages is the purpose of a civil rights litigation, a district court,
in fixing fees, is obligated to give primary consideration to the amount of damages awarded
as compared to the amount sought. In some civil rights cases, however, the court may
consider the vindication of constitutional rights in addition to the amount of damages
recovered.... It probably will be the rare case in which an award of private damages can be
said to benefit the public interest to an extent that would justify the disproportionality
between damages and fees reflected in this case.
Id. at 585, 586 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 107, 115-16 (1992)
(applying the proportionality rule of attorney's fees to strike down a fee of $280,ooo in a case where
the plaintiff obtained only nominal damages of $i).
i i i. Rivera, 477 U.S. at 576, 580 (plurality opinion); id. at 585 (Powell, J., concurring).
I12. Id. at 58o (plurality opinion). These adequate safeguards included a legal standard permitting
only "reasonable" fee awards, judicial discretion to deny fees in appropriate cases, and preclusion of
fees incurred after a pretrial settlement offer greater than the amount recovered at trial. Id. at 58o-8I.
113. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 6oo (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
114. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003); Gore, 517 U.S. at 568;
Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. i, 19 (i99i); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 9o8(1)
(1977).
II5. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 473 (993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
("Rather than producing a judgment founded on verifiable criteria, they produced a monstrous
award-526 times actual damages and over 20 times greater than any punitive award in West Virginia
history.").
i6. Gore, 517 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Justice Thomas) ("Today we see the
November 20071
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
and their threat of awarding punitives based on "prejudice, bias, and
caprice" against big business." In response, the Court has imposed a rule
of proportionality to limit excessive punitive awards.
This modern rule of strict, mathematical proportionality alters the
longstanding gross excessiveness standard to now require an
affirmatively reasonable award, one that is just right."9 In Honda Motor
Co. v. Oberg, the Court discussed the common-law standard from early
English times that reviewed damages, both compensatory and punitive,
for gross excessiveness, looking for damages that were so "'outrageous'
that "'all mankind at first blush must think so.' ..... The Oberg Court
struck down an Oregon state law that prohibited common-law judicial
review and deferred solely to the jury.'2 ' Since then, the Court's federal
oversight of state punitive awards has developed a more demanding
measure of punitive relief, requiring a court to pinpoint the precise
measure on the remedial spectrum that is "reasonable," rather than
merely striking down those awards at the unreasonable extremes.'22 The
practical effect of this stricter standard is to overturn more jury awards of
punitive damages.
I. Strict Proportionality for Punitives
The Court's proportionality rule for punitives requires that the
measure of punitive damages correspond to the wrongfulness of the
conduct: "[C]ourts must ensure that the measure of punishment is both
reasonable and proportionate to the amount of harm to the plaintiff and
to the general damages recovered..' 23 Proportionality is determined by
use of "three guideposts," directing judges to examine the
reprehensibility of the defendant's action, the amount of harm caused,
latest manifestation of this Court's recent and increasingly insistent concern about punitive damages
that run wild." (internal quotation omitted)); TXO, 509 U.S. at 475 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Haslip,
499 U.S. at 18 ("We note once again our concern about punitive damages that 'run wild."').
117. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also TXO, 509 U.S. at 50o (O'Connor, J., dissenting,
joined by Justice Stevens) ("Recently, however, the frequency and size of such awards have been
skyrocketing.").
18. TXO, 509 U.S. at 474 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); State Farm, 538 U.S. at 417 ("Jury
instructions typically leave the jury with wide discretion in choosing amounts, and the presentation of
evidence of a defendant's net worth creates the potential that juries will use their verdicts to express
biases against big businesses, particularly those without strong local presences." (quoting Honda
Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 432 (1994))).
119. See Karlan, supra note 102, at 903 (identifying Gore as "transforming the longstanding
constitutional principle that civil damages awards cannot be 'grossly excessive"').
120. 512 U.S. 415,421-22 (1994) (quoting Huckle v. Money, (1763) 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B.)).
121. Oberg, 512 U.S. at 430.
122. But see id. at 437 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J.) (arguing that the
Constitution only imposes an "outer limit on remedies" and does not guarantee a "right to a correct
determination of the 'reasonableness' of a punitive damages award," and noting that a violation of
"reasonableness" does not establish that the award is "grossly excessive").
123. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 426.
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and the societal indication of wrong embodied in other sanctions.'24 The
ultimate balance between the harm caused and appropriate measure of
punitives must satisfy a precise mathematical ratio between
compensatory and punitive damages.'
This proportionality rule demanding predictable computation of
punitives is a departure from the common-law theory that punitives
should be indeterminate in order to effectively punish or deter a
defendant. ' The common-law theory ensured that defendants could not
calculate punitives into the cost of doing business and thereby continue
to engage in socially undesirable behavior. 127 Punitives internalize the
costs of reprehensible conduct where the market has failed to deter the
rational economic actor because the wrongdoing creates only external
costs.'"" Lack of predictability was the true force behind punitive
damages, because it prevented reprehensible conduct from becoming a
rational economic choice.
Courts traditionally reviewed punitive damages for extreme results
falling at the outer limits of reasoned judgment. Using a type of "I know
it when I see it" approach, courts looked to whether punitive awards
"shocked the judicial conscience" or "jarred constitutional sensibilities"
in deciding whether to overturn the traditional deference to the finders
of fact.'29 In the modern era, however, the Supreme Court has rejected
this longstanding norm of weak judicial oversight, and instead has
adopted a rule of precise measurement for punitive damages
affirmatively mandating "reasonable" measures.
Glimmers of a strict proportionality rule first appeared in 1993, in
TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.3' In TXO, the
124. Id. at 418; BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,574-75 (1996).
125. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 424-25 (suggesting that punitives be within a range of two to nine
times as large as compensatory damages); see also infra text accompanying notes i5o-59 .
126. Cf Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 58-59 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(advocating proportionality for punitives and rejecting argument that proper deterrence of corporate
wrongdoing necessitates unpredictable and disproportionate punitive awards from jury).
127. See Man v. Raymark Indus., 728 F. Supp. 1461, 1467 (D. Haw. 1989) ("Punitive damages serve
to deter manufacturers as, unlike with compensatory damages, the defendant is prevented from
making the 'coldblooded calculation' that it is more profitable to pay claims than correct a defect.");
Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 218 (Colo. 1984) ("If punitive damages are predictably
certain, they become just another item in the cost of doing business, much like other production costs,
and thereby induce a reluctance on the part of the manufacturer to sacrifice profit by removing a
correctible defect."); Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal
Pluralism, 42 Am. U. L. REV. 1393, 1430 (I993); Walter Lucas, Op-Ed., Punitives Cap Makes Injury a
Cost of Doing Business, N.J. L.J., Oct. 24, 1994, at 789,804.
128. Kevin S. Marshall & Patrick Fitzgerald, Punitive Damages and the Supreme Court's
Reasonable Relationship Test: Ignoring the Economics of Deterrence, 19 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT.
237, 251 (2005).
129. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 446-66 (1993) (plurality opinion);
Haslip, 499 U.S. at i8 (majority opinion).
130. 509 U.S. 443.
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plurality rejected the parties' request for an absolute test or
mathematical bright line that would determine the excessiveness of
punitive awards.'3 ' In Three Bears fashion, the Court rejected each side's
argument as too extreme finding that the plaintiffs asked for too much in
seeking to uphold any punitive award that legitimately sought to punish
or deter, and that defendants sought too little relief in seeking to subject
all punitives to heightened scrutiny.'32 Instead, the plurality adopted what
has since been labeled a "narrow" proportionality test under which it
reviewed the punitive damages award to determine whether it was
"grossly excessive.""'3 The narrow proportionality standard does not
mandate a particular measure of punitive damages, but rather operates
to strike down awards outside the zone of reasonableness. Under this
cursory check for excessiveness, a divided Court in TXO upheld an
award of $io million in punitives for $r9,ooo in compensatory damages. '
While the actual loss to the plaintiff was low, the Court found that the
potential loss threatened was several million dollars, and this potential
harm, coupled with the defendant's egregious bad faith of bringing false
lawsuits against innocent business parties, made such an award
reasonable. "
Justice O'Connor, however, criticized this weak standard of review
and argued for a more principled guide to lower courts as to the
arbitrariness of punitive damages.' It was O'Connor's dissent in TXO
that raised the specter of proportionality for punitive damages. '
O'Connor argued that the notion of proportionality was implicit in due
process as the antithesis of arbitrary state action.13 She observed that
"the requirement of proportionality is 'deeply rooted and frequently
repeated in common-law jurisprudence."3.9 Strict judicial review of
punitive damages, O'Connor said, ensured that the "ancient and
fundamental principle of justice is observed-that the punishment be
131. Id. at 456.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 458.
134. Id. at 446-72. Justice Stevens, writing for the plurality and its invocation of a narrow
proportionality standard, was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun. Id. at 446.
Justice Kennedy wrote a concurrence criticizing the use of a quantitative rather than qualitative
analysis for excessiveness. Id. at 466 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Justices Scalia and Thomas, also concurring in the judgment upholding the award, rejected the premise
that the Constitution grants any power to the Supreme Court to review awards of punitive damages.
Id. at 470 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
135. Id. at 462 (plurality opinion).
136. Id. at 48o (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("In Solomonic fashion, the plurality rejects both
petitioner's and respondents' proffered approaches, instead selecting a seemingly moderate course.
But the course the plurality chooses is, in fact, no course at all." (citation omitted)).
137. Id. at 478-79. Although Justice Souter did not join this portion of the dissent, Justice White
joined in full. Id. at 472.
138. Id. at 479.
139. Id. at 478.
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proportionate to the offense. ' 4
The proportionality rule from O'Connor's dissent emerged as the
majority rule just three years later in BMW of North America, Inc. v.
Gore.'4' With little explanation, the three split opinions of TXO
combined to form a rule endorsing a strict proportionality standard for
punitive damages that incorporated both qualitative and quantitative
factors. 42 In Gore, the plaintiff was awarded $2 million dollars for
BMW's fraud of selling a car as new, failing to disclose it had been
repainted.' 43 The plaintiff's damages from the fraud were $4,000, the
amount of the reduced market value of a used car.'" The Court reacted
to the plaintiff's windfall for such an inconsequential economic harm by
adopting the "three guideposts" to guide the courts' decisions as to a
proper measure of punitive damages: punitives should be proportional to
i) the reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct; 2) the amount of
compensatory damages awarded; and 3) the amount of other civil
sanctions.45 In Gore, like TXO, disproportionality between punitives and
the amount of harm indicated that the judge should "raise a
suspicious... eyebrow.'
' I46
While the Court found it important to adopt a new, heightened
standard of proportionality in Gore, the result did not depend upon this
standard. Gore was an easy case, as Justice Breyer explained:
[T]he severe disproportionality between the award and the legitimate
punitive damages objectives ... reflects a judgment about a matter of
degree. I recognize that it is often difficult to determine just when a
punitive award exceeds an amount reasonably related to a State's
legitimate interests, or when that excess is so great as to amount to a
matter of constitutional concern. Yet whatever the difficulties of
drawing a precise line, once we examine the award in this case, it is not
difficult to say that this award lies on the line's far side. The severe lack
of proportionality between the size of the award and the underlying
punitive damages objectives shows that the award falls into the
category of "gross excessiveness" set forth in the Court's prior cases. '
Nonetheless, the Court emerged from Gore with a stricter standard
of proportionality requiring the Court to choose a more precise point
140. Id.
141. 517 U.S. 559, 574 (996).
142. Justice O'Connor's position in TXO quietly won the day as her dissent and Kennedy's
concurrence in TXO combined into a five-Justice majority for strict proportionality in the Gore
opinion authored by the same writer as in TXO, Justice Stevens. See generally Gore, 517 U.S. 559;
TXO, 509 U.S. 443.
143. Gore, 517 U.S. at 564,567.
144. Id. at 564-65.
145. See id. at 574-75; see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 4o8, 418
(2003) (instructing courts to consider the guideposts when reviewing punitive damages).
146. Gore, 517 U.S. at 583 (quoting TXO, 509 U.S. at 481 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
147. Id. at 596-97 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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along the remedial spectrum as to reasonable relief. Rather than merely
identifying an award as so severe and oppressive as to fall within the
zone of arbitrariness as had been done in the past,' 48 courts were now
instructed to more closely approximate a "reasonable" measure of
punitive damages. Subsequently, the Court adopted a de novo standard
of review for punitive awards in order to facilitate the exacting inquiry
needed to apply strict proportionality and avoid the more deferential
narrow proportionality standard of outlying excessiveness.'49
In 2003, the Court refined the strict proportionality standard as a
mathematical ratio in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Campbell.'50 In State Farm, the Court overturned an award of punitive
damages in the amount of $145 million for State Farm's bad faith and
intentional infliction of emotional distress against one of its insureds.'5'
State Farm covered up the liability of its insured in a fatal car accident,
refused to settle for the policy limits, and then threatened its own
insured, the Campbells, with losing their home."' The Court identified
the legal problem in the case as the "imprecise manner" of measuring
punitive damages.'53 The six-Justice majority had "no doubt that there is
a presumption against an award that has a 145-tO-I ratio. '
In the past, the Court had resisted pressure to set a concrete
mathematical formula for the proper measure of punitives:
Of course, we have consistently rejected the notion that the
constitutional line is marked by a simple mathematical formula, even
one that compares actual and potential damages to the punitive
award.... "We need not, and indeed we cannot, draw a mathematical
bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and the
constitutionally unacceptable that would fit every case."55
Nevertheless, in State Farm the Court identified a range of concrete
ratios of appropriate proportional measures of punitive damages. I16 The
Court suggested that "single-digit" multipliers of damages are more
148. See, e.g., St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 67 (1919); Waters-
Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 111 (i909); Karlan, supra note 102.
149. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 418 (citing Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532
U.S. 424,436 (2001)).
15o. Id. at 425.
15 1. Id. at 426.
152. Id. at 43.
153. Id. at 417.
154. Id. at 426. Chief Justice Rehnquist crossed over in State Farm to embrace the strict
proportionality he had previously rejected. See id. at 411. The three dissenters, Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Ginsburg, continued to believe that proportionality analysis and federal court review of
punitive damages was not mandated under the Constitution. See id. at 429 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at
429-30 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 43I (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
155. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582-83 (1996) (citing TXO Prod. Corp. v.
Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443,458 (1993) (plurality opinion)).
156. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 424-25.
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likely to comport with due process, and that ratios of four to one were
generally defensible.'57 It also noted with favor a long legislative history
of adopting ratios of double, triple, or quadruple damages."5 Thus,
punitives were largely restricted to two to nine times the amount of
compensatory damages awarded in a case.' 9
State Farm, like Gore, was "neither close nor difficult." '6° The
application of a narrow proportionality standard of gross excessiveness
would have sufficed to invalidate the extreme punitive award.
Nevertheless, the Court took the opportunity to craft a more stringent
standard of proportionality necessitating a careful assessment of punitive
damages. The concern with precise, careful measurement and close
quantitative nexus are all indicative of a strict proportionality standard.
2. Proportionality as a Constitutional Mandate for Fairness
The Supreme Court has located the requirement of proportionality
for punitive damages in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.' 6' The Court has expressly stated that both procedural and
substantive due process guarantees are implicated in an excessive
punitive award."62 The Due Process Clause prohibits the imposition of
grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments: "The reason is that
'[ellementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional
jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the
conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of
the penalty that a State may impose." 6' Grounding proportionality in
constitutional notions of fairness has potentially broad implications, as all
remedies, not just punitives, may be said to require constitutionally fair
results.'6 4
157. Id. at 425.
I58. Id.
159. Id. There are some exceptions to the mathematical ratio, such as when the conduct is
clandestine and capable of evading detection, when the compensatory measure is particularly
substantial, or when the compensatory measure is low but the defendant's act is egregious. Id.; see also
Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 676-78 (7th Cir. 2003) (discussing the economic
bases for deviating from a strict mathematical ratio for punitives).
16o. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 418; see Gore, 517 U.S. at 596 (Breyer, J., concurring).
161. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 416; Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S.
424,433-34 (2OO); Gore, 517 U.S. at 559; TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453-
55 (993) (plurality opinion). But see A. Benjamin Spencer, Due Process and Punitive Damages: The
Error of Federal Excessiveness Jurisprudence, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. Io85, 1123-29 (2oo6) (arguing that the
Court's proportionality rule for punitives has no basis in the Due Process Clause).
162. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 416. Not all Justices, however, agree that the Constitution embodies
this proportionality principle. Id. at 429-30 (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting). Justices Ginsburg and
Scalia additionally argue that proportionality review is an unjustified intrusion into the province of the
state governments and thus is not sanctioned by the Constitution. Gore, 517 U.S. at 6o7 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting); id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
163. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 417 (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 574).
164. Tracy A. Thomas, Restriction of Tort Remedies and the Constraints of Due Process: The Right
to an Adequate Remedy, 39 AKRON L. REV. 957, 997-98 (2006) (arguing that the Due Process Clause
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Excessive punitive awards are unfair to defendants, according to the
Court, because they fail procedurally to provide adequate notice to the
defendant of the rule of law.' 6' A proportionality rule thus promotes
consistency in awards and provides the constitutionally-required notice
of the potential legal consequences of reprehensible conduct.'6 Excessive
punitives are also unfair to defendants in the arbitrariness of the amount
of the award.' 67 Proportionality reins in excess and avoids arbitrary
governmental action that violates substantive due process.
Conceptualized as a due process issue, proportionality becomes a tool
used to prevent encroachment on individual rights.' 68
The individual right at issue is the property interest of the
defendant.' 69 Of prime concern is when the property interest of the
defendant is used to create a windfall for the plaintiff. Justice Kennedy,
writing for the majority in State Farm, was particularly troubled by the
potential duplication of awarding both punitives and emotional distress
damages: "Much of the distress was caused by the outrage and
humiliation the Campbells suffered at the actions of their insurer; and it
is a major role of punitive damages to condemn such conduct.
Compensatory damages, however, already contain this punitive
element.' 7. In other words, a plaintiff's emotional indignation and the
defendant's reprehensible conduct are merely two sides of the same coin:
one (the distress) is simply the reaction to the other act (the
reprehensible conduct). Thus, the Court intimates that damages based on
the intentional infliction of emotional distress already compensate for
the defendant's wrongful act.'7'
Ultimately, the Court is concerned about the constitutional rights of
the defendants, particularly those of big corporate defendants that might
requires a floor of a minimally adequate measure of tort damagesfor plaintiffs); see also Paul DeCamp,
Beyond State Farm: Due Process Constraints on Noneconomic Compensatory Damages, 27 HARV. J.L.
& PuB. POL'Y 231, 291 (2003) (arguing that noneconomic compensatory damages must be scrutinized
like punitive damages); Mark Geistfeld, Constitutional Tort Reform, 38 Loy. L.A. L. Rav. 1093, 1093-
94 (2005) (endorsing expanded substantive due process review to limit tort damages).
165. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 417.
66. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 587 (Breyer, J., concurring).
167. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 416.
168. Ristroph, supra note 47, at 292-98.
169. Id. at 298.
170. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 426 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. c (1977)).
171. Id. In concluding that punitive damages were redundant with compensatory non-economic
damages, Justice Kennedy relied upon the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states: "In many cases
in which compensatory damages include an amount for emotional distress, such as humiliation or
indignation aroused by the defendant's act, there is no clear line of demarcation between punishment
and compensation and a verdict for a specified amount frequently includes elements of both." § 908
cmt. c (1977); see also Michael B. Kelly, Do Punitive Damages Compensate Society?, 41 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 1429, 1429-30 (2004) (explaining how punitive damages originated as a way to justify jury awards
that exceeded tangible losses, and that such a need disappeared when the law began to compensate for
insult, indignity, and distress).
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bear the brunt of jurors' animosity and bias. The excessive size of
punitive awards, Justice Kennedy surmised, can be "explained by the
jury's raw, redistributionist impulses stemming from antipathy to a
wealthy, out-of-state corporate defendant."'' 7 Justice O'Connor further
explained:
Corporations are mere abstractions and, as such are unlikely to be
viewed with much sympathy. Moreover, they often represent a large
accumulation of productive resources; jurors naturally think little of
taking an otherwise large sum of money out of what appears to be an
enormously larger pool of wealth. Finally, juries may feel privileged to
correct perceived social ills stemming from unequal wealth distribution
by transferring money from "wealthy" corporations to comparatively
needier plaintiffs.'
73
The Court justifies its concern for corporate wrongdoers as
economically based, finding that a corporation's "status as an active
participant in the national economy implicates the federal interest in
preventing individual States from imposing undue burdens on interstate
commerce."' 74 Among other concerns, Justice O'Connor noted how the
threat of enormous punitive damage awards has a detrimental effect on
the research and development of new products.'75 These national
concerns, as well as concerns under the fairness guarantees of the Due
Process Clause, thus weigh in favor of protecting defendants from
untoward remedial consequences.
B. REINING IN INJUNCTIONS
In the context of injunctions, proportionality again operates to limit
the remedial power of the court. Proportionality is explained as a
mechanism to rein in the expansive power of lower court outlaws who
engage in judicial policymaking through broad injunctive relief. The
proportionality principle manifests itself as a doctrinal rule requiring that
the scope of the injunction match the scope of the harm. 76
Proportionality for injunctive relief, the Court has stated, derives from
the inherent concept of fairness embodied in equity that balances all of
172. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 468 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(noting that Justice O'Connor "makes a plausible argument" that the punitive award is explained by
the jury's bias against corporations, but finding that the corporation's proven malice provided a
sufficient basis to sustain the award).
173. Id. at 491 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
174. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,585 (1996).
175. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Some manufacturers of prescription drugs, for example,
have decided that it is better to avoid uncertain liability than to introduce a new pill or vaccine into the
market. Similarly, designers of airplanes and motor vehicles have been forced to abandon new projects
for fear of lawsuits that can often lead to awards of punitive damages."(citation omitted)).
176. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 547 (1996); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (5996);
Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 7o, 84 (1995).
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the interests in a remedial calculation.'77 However, proportionality is a
one-way street: it is used to protect defendants against disproportionate
remedies, but plaintiffs do not receive comparable protection.
i. Developing Standards of Proportionality
As with punitive damages, proportionality for injunctions has
evolved from weak oversight to a strict standard of review. The Court
developed its rule of proportionality for injunctions in the school
desegregation cases. Ts Law professors summarizing these cases at the
time viewed the structural injunctions as "the most untailored remedy
imaginable"'79 and assumed that the Court had abandoned any effort to
cabin equitable remedial discretion within the right-remedy
proportionality nexus.' 8° What was at play, however, was a weak
proportionality standard under which the Court cursorily reviewed lower
court injunctions for excess. The Court utilized a weak proportionality or
"right-remedy" standard which gave great weight to the lower court's
fact-finding expertise and determination of a fair remedy.'8' Under this
weak standard, most, but not all, of the school desegregation case
challenges were upheld. 
8
,
The watershed change in the application of the proportionality
177. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I, 31 (1971) ("However, in
seeking to define the scope of remedial power or the limits on remedial power of courts in an area as
sensitive as we deal with here, words are poor instruments to convey the sense of basic fairness
inherent in equity. Substance, not semantics, must govern ....").
178. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 1), 418 U.S. 717,738 (974); Swann, 402 U.S. at 15-16.
179. Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L.
REV. i, 46 n.94 (i979). Professor Fiss supported this type of untailored relief, calling for judges to
exercise their discretion and flexibility for the public good. Id.
i8o. Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court 1981 Term-Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the
Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 55 (1982) (noting the Court has "more or less given up the effort" of
forming any "systematic substantive limitations on the scope of relief"); Friedman, supra note 31, at
747 (arguing that the right-remedy test is "vague and somewhat indeterminate" and permits courts "to
do pretty much what they want"); John Leubsdorf, Completing the Desegregation Remedy, 57 B.U. L.
REV. 39, 83-85 (977); Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable
Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661, 715 (i978) (critiquing the right-remedy connection as
"indeterminate").
I81. See Wendy Parker, The Supreme Court and Public Law Remedies: A Tale of Two Kansas
Cities, 50 HASrINos L.J. 475, 540 (1999) (discussing the Court's adoption of an indeterminate right-
remedy test); Kent Roach, The Limits of Corrective Justice and the Potential of Equity in Constitutional
Remedies, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 859, 859-60 (5991) (discussing the weak standard of review for injunctions
under which "[riemedies are reviewed deferentially only to determine if there was an abuse of
discretion and the trial judge is allowed to balance all the competing equities that are presented in the
circumstances of the particular case").
182. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 11), 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (upholding remedial education
programs to remedy school segregation); Swann, 402 U.S. at 16 (permitting federal courts to order
busing, student ratios, and attendance zones to desegregate schools); United States v. Montgomery
County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225 (1969) (upholding mathematical ratios to desegregate faculty and




standard for injunctions came in Missouri v. Jenkins.'8' The four
dissenting Justices, led by Justice Souter, struggled to retain the weak
proportionality standard under which injunctions would be reviewed
only for "exceptional circumstances" or "obvious error.""' The majority,
however, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist adopted a stronger
proportionality standard under which it overturned the lower court
injunction, ordering salary increases for school personnel and state
funding for remedial achievement programs.' Justice Thomas,
concurring in Jenkins, revealed the extent to which the Court's holding
departed from its past application of weak proportionality in the
injunction context. He argued that remedial decrees had gotten out of
hand, and that "the time has come for us to put the genie back in the
bottle."' Thomas argued that the Court should "demand that remedial
decrees be more precisely designed" to avoid the type of "hit-or-miss
method" of shaping remedies that had been employed in the past."' This
demand for a reasonable, carefully tailored remedy signaled the advent
of strict remedial proportionality. Applying this strict standard, it
appears that defendants usually win.
2. The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly
In the new millennium, the injunctive proportionality tale told by the
Supreme Court is a story of good defendants, bad overreaching plaintiffs,
and ugly overzealous courts. In this narrative, plaintiffs, often aided by
the courts, reach for the moon, seeking social justice and windfall gains at
the expense of overtaxed defendants. Concerns about the consequences
of the injunction for the defendants, who are more often than not
institutional actors, drive the decisions. Inverting the normal balance of
plaintiffs deserving vindication from wrongdoing defendants, these cases
portray proportionality as a tool to restore justice for defendants.
a. The Good: Overburdened Defendants
Remedial injunctive proportionality cases are striking due to the
Court's concern for the interests of the established wrongdoer. The
individual freedom of the defendants emerges as a key factor in
measuring the appropriate proportion of injunctive relief. The
theoretical origins of such a heightened standard are left unstated.
Perhaps it is merely a doctrinal leftover from the First Amendment
183. 515 U.S. 70 (995).
184. Id. at 138-39, 157 (Souter, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 73, 78-79 (majority opinion).
186. Id. at 123 (Thomas, J., concurring).
187. Id. at 135, 137. In arguing for a strict proportionality standard, Justice Thomas pointed out the
lack of teeth in a weak proportionality standard: "If the standard reduces to what one believes is a
'fair' remedy, or what vaguely appears to be a good 'fit' between violation and remedy, then there is
little hope of imposing the constraints on the equity power that the Framers envisioned and that our
constitutional system requires." Id. at 134.
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overbreadth context. Proportionality for injunctions originated in the
prior restraint cases of overbreadth, in which the Court sought to protect
the First Amendment rights of the defendant."" Perhaps it is the unique
status of injunctive relief which operates prospectively to restrict the
future freedom of the defendant. The restriction on behavior that may or
may not be illegal, the potential for contempt penalties, and the possible
curtailment of defendants' otherwise efficient behavior may counsel in
favor of respecting their interests in the remedial calculus.'
89
The Court's explanation for its heightened standard is based on
pragmatic concerns for the institutional actors who serve as defendants in
these cases. At times the institutional concern manifests as a practical
management issue governing the expertise of the defendant in handling
the day-to-day affairs of the institution.' 9 At other times the institutional
concern is translated as one of federalism, both horizontal and vertical,
when courts assume responsibilities granted to another branch of
government.'9 It is clear that the Court is reluctant to direct the activities
of institutional and corporate defendants, despite their proven
wrongdoing.
The Court began to develop this tale of the good defendant in the
school desegregation cases. 92 In these cases, it began to establish the
doctrinal rules embodying judicial concern for defendants. Under these
rules, defendants are given the first opportunity to remedy the harm or
to craft an appropriate remedial plan.'93 If the defendants fail in that
voluntary effort, then the court must weigh carefully the interests of the
institutional defendants in managing their own affairs in the remedial
process.94 For example, in Lewis v. Casey, the detailed prison law library
i88. See Zoller, supra note 3, at 580 ("If an analogy to the [international] proportionality principle
had to be found in current American law, the closest would be the overbreadth doctrine that comes
into play to invalidate laws that sweep in too much speech."). For example, in the recent case of Tory
v. Cochran, the Court used proportionality to invalidate an injunction in a defamation action
preventing all future speech about the infamous lawyer, Johnnie Cochran, by a former client. 544 U.S.
734, 736 (2oo5). After Cochran's death, the Court found the injunction to be "an overly broad prior
restraint upon speech, lacking plausible justification." Id. at 738. For another example, see Madsen v.
Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 0994), which invalidated parts of an injunction restricting
behavior of abortion protestors on grounds that the injunction interfered with protestors' First
Amendment rights.
189. See LAYCOCK, supra note 63.
i9o. See, e.g., City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 220 (2oo5).
191. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 131-35 (995) (Thomas, J., concurring); Parker,
supra note 181 (stating that most often federalism is shown by deference to the defendants in school
desegregation cases). But see Siegel, supra note 99 (suggesting that the Court's main theme is not
driven by federalism, despite the frequent cites to federalism concerns, but instead by hostility to
litigation).
192. See Parker, supra note i81, at 534-35 (exploring the dominant deference to defendants in
school desegregation cases).
193. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343,362 (I996); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678,687 (1978).
194. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 88 ("[F]ederal courts in devising a remedy must take into account the
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injunction failed not just because it was overbroad, but also because it
failed to accord proper deference to the judgment of prison
administrators and to give them a first opportunity to correct their
errors.'
95
Modern cases of remedial proportionality in injunctions demonstrate
continued deference to defendants and a heightened concern for their
interests. For example, in Sherrill, the Court highlighted the interests of
the city from whom the Oneida tribe was seeking tax immunity as a basis
for denying the injunctive relief.' 96 The Court was concerned about the
impact of a contrary decision upon the city, which had relied upon the
non-Indian status of the land for more than two hundred years, building
its city, developing its zoning, and relying upon the tax base.'"
Technically, the Court effectuated this concern through the doctrinal
vehicle of laches, reasoning that New York's two centuries of continuous
regulatory jurisdiction created "justifiable expectations" on the part of
the city, buttressed by the Oneida's delay in asserting their claims: "The
long history of state sovereign control precludes the Oneida from
rekindling embers of sovereignty that long ago grew cold."'' 98 The
majority stated that allowing tax immunity for the Oneida's parcels
would "seriously burden the administration of state and local
governments and would adversely affect landowners neighboring the
tribal patches.""' The Court framed this as an "impracticality" defense to
the injunction, finding that it was impractical to return to Indian control
land that generations earlier passed into numerous private hands.2"
Similarly, in Ayotte, the Court relied upon the interests of the
defendant to deny the broad injunction."' The proportionality calculus
was driven by the Court's overriding concern for the institutional
defendant, the New Hampshire legislature. It identified "three
interrelated principles inform[ing]" its decision, all of which pertained to
the defendant.2"2 First, the Court stated, it tries not to nullify more of a
legislature's work than is necessary, for such a ruling frustrates the intent
of the elected representatives of the people."° Second, the Court
attempts to avoid devising a judicial remedy that essentially rewrites
state law, "mindful that our constitutional mandate and institutional
interests of state and local authorities in managing their own affairs, consistent with the Constitution."
(quoting Milliken II, 433 U.S. 267, 28o-8i (1977)).
195. 58 U.S. at 361-62.
196. 544 U.S. 197, 220 (2005).
197. Id. at 220-21.
198. Id. at 214.
199. Id. at 220.
200. Id. at 219.





competence are limited.""0 4 It held that such remedial "line-drawing" was
"inherently complex" and a "serious invasion of the legislative
domain."2" Third, the Court held that the "touchstone for any decision
about remedy is legislative intent, for a court cannot 'use its remedial
powers to circumvent the intent of the legislature. ' ''26 Ultimately, the
Court viewed its most important remedial restraint as the proper respect
of a federal court for the institutional functioning of the state legislature,
despite the unconstitutional actions of that legislature.
b. The Bad: Overreaching Plaintiffs
The second character in the Court's tale of injunctive proportionality
is the overreaching plaintiff. The Court is often explicit in stating its
belief that plaintiffs overreach by requesting excess relief. Such excess
relief produces windfalls to plaintiffs or society beyond what justice
requires. The doctrinal rule that an injunctive remedy return a plaintiff to
the position she would have occupied in the absence of the defendant's
illegal conduct restricts the plaintiff's ability to receive a remedial
windfall."° Plaintiffs are not to obtain an advantage in excess of this
position, nor is the remedy to benefit third parties not harmed by the
conduct at issue. Beyond this mechanical doctrinal rule, however, lies a
greater supicion of plaintiffs and a distrust of their motivations in the
litigation.
For example, underlying the Court's decision in Jenkins, in which it
struck down an overbroad school desegregation decree," was a belief in
the suspect motives of some of the parties. The Court noted the collusion
between the parties and the school district in using the litigation to
leverage funding for improved education." ' The school district initially
filed as a plaintiff along with the parents, though it was later realigned as
a nominal defendant .... "The KCMSD, which has pursued a 'friendly
adversary' relationship with the plaintiffs, has continued to propose ever
204. Id.
205. Id. at 330.
206. Id. (quoting Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 94 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)).
207. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 547 (t996); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70,87 (995).
208. The converse is also true. Where the Court finds the motives of the plaintiff to be in good
faith, it is more likely to grant injunctive relief. See Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao
Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 430-32 (2oo6) (upholding preliminary injunction permitting religious sect's
continued use of a controlled substance due to their good faith beliefs).
209. 515 U.S. 70.
210. Id. at 82. The dissenting opinion in the appellate court "characterized 'the current effort by
KCMSD and the American Federation of Teachers ... aided by the plaintiffs to bypass the collective
bargaining process' as 'uncalled for' and 'probably not an exercise reasonably related to the
constitutional violations found by the court."' Id. at 82 (quoting Jenkins v. Missouri, 19 F.3d 393, 399
(8th Cir. 1994) (Beam, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)).
211. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 74.
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more expensive programs. , 12 The Court accused the parties of bypassing
the normal process of collective bargaining by colluding in the litigation
to obtain higher salaries funded by the state.213
This collusion led the plaintiffs to continually seek "extravagant,"
"elaborate" programs designed to obtain one of the best public
educations in the nation.2"4 The plaintiffs obtained public schools with air
conditioning, a planetarium, greenhouses, a model United Nations room,
an art gallery, an animal farm, and movie screening rooms." ' "The
District Court candidly has acknowledged that it has 'allowed the District
planners to dream and provide the mechanism for those dreams to be
realized..1.. 6 This overreaching was clearly beyond the pale and triggered
the conclusion of disproportionate relief.
The same belief in the corrupt motives of overreaching plaintiffs
guided Justice Kennedy's concurrence in eBay."7 Plaintiff MercExchange
won $35 million in damages after a jury trial for eBay's infringement of
its business method patent in creating the eBay on-line auction
company."' MercExchange then sought an injunction prohibiting eBay's
use of the patented method in the future. 9 The parties had previously
tried to reach a licensing agreement permitting eBay's use of the on-line
method, but were unsuccessful."2
Four concurring Justices wrote separately to express concerns over
the potential overreaching of the plaintiff.22 ' These Justices identified the
plaintiff as one of a new breed of "patent trolls," who seek to enforce a
patent in an area where it does not actively compete with a product or
process.2 In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy recognized that "[a]n
industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for
producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining
212. Id. at 79.
213. See id.
214. Id. at 91, 98-99.
215. Id. at 79, 92.
2 16. Id. at 8o.
217. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S.Ct., 1837, 1842-43 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). In contrast, the concurrence by Chief Justice Roberts noted the respect with which
plaintiff patent holders were historically treated under the law in generally having their requests for
injunctive relief granted. Id. at 1841-42 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
218. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 698 (E.D. Va. 2003).
219. eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1839; see also MercExchange, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 710-1I.
220. eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1839. The district court noted the acrimony between the parties,
commenting that 'this case has been one of the more, if not the most, contentious cases that this court
has ever presided over." MercExchange, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 714.
221. eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring, joined by Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ.).
222. See id.; Seidenberg, supra note 88. A "patent troll" is a "nefarious term for businesses that
produce no products or services and have the sole purpose of obtaining money by licensing patents
they own and winning infringement lawsuits against others." Id. The term was first used in 2ooi by in-




licensing fees."2"3 He expressed concerns about a remedial rule that
created windfalls to these plaintiffs in cases where the patent was only a
business method patent and "when the patented invention is but a small
component of the product the defendant company seeks to produce."2 '4
For in these cases, the "injunction is employed simply for undue leverage
in negotiations" by threatening to close down the defendant's entire
business. 25 For Kennedy, this misuse of injunctive relief to garner
excessive power in the economic arena militated against the issuance of
injunctions to future patent trolls."6
The character of the overreaching plaintiff appears again in
Sherrill."7 The Oneida Indian tribe brought a series of cases over several
decades trying to reclaim ancient tribal lands wrongfully taken by the
government. In a prior decision, the Supreme Court held that the tribe
had a right to assert damages as compensation for lands wrongfully
taken. Subsequently, the Oneida sought tax immunity for several
parcels of land the tribe had reacquired from private owners on the open
market. '9 It seems that the Court thought the Indian tribe was seeking
more than its fair share of relief by following a successful bid for
damages on a novel claim with yet another request for prospective relief.
The Oneida had gone one step too far, and the Court no longer would be
a willing player in the claim for restorative justice more properly
addressed in the legislative arena. 3 The lone dissenter in Sherrill, Justice
Stevens, challenged the notion of the excessive plaintiff, stating that "the
majority's fear of opening a Pandora's box of tribal powers is greatly
exaggerated.2 ... He pointed out the inconsistency of previously
recognizing the Oneidas as the owners of the land, and their attendant
right to collect damages for that land, but not permitting them to assert
223. eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
224. Id.; see also Seidenberg, supra note 88, at 54.
225. eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Seidenberg, supra note 88, at 54.
However, the flip side of this concern with overreaching is the recognition that many "patent trolls"
are small inventors whose methods and processes have been appropriated by large companies like
Microsoft and Intel. Id. at 51-54. Small inventors often enter into negotiations with large companies to
license their inventions. When negotiations break down, the large company proceeds to use the new
technology without a license, and the small inventor is left with no intellectual property and the high-
cost of patent litigation. Id.
226. eBay, 126 S.Ct. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
227. 544 U.S. 197 (2005).
228. See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 240 (1985).
229. See Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 210-11.
230. The availability of an alternative remedy in a federal process for placing Indian land in federal
trust mitigated the Court's seemingly harsh decision. See Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 220-21. While the
Oneida did not pursue this option, they nevertheless found relief in subsequent proceedings when, on
remand, the tribe won tax immunity under a New York state law that precluded taxation of tribal
property owners. See Oneida Indian Nation v. Madison County, 401 F. Supp. 2d 219, 232 (N.D.N.Y.
2005).
231. Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 226 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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injunctive relief as owners of the same land.3 ' The majority, however,
drew a line, permitting legal but not equitable relief to prevent an
excessive award to the tribe.
c. The Ugly: Overzealous Courts
As the narrative continues, the Supreme Court rides in on its white
horse of remedial proportionality to save us all from the tyranny of
overzealous courts. In this tale, the lower courts are the ugly villains who
inflict harm with their remedial weapons, using their equitable powers
for purposes other than to make the plaintiff whole. The rule of
proportionality thus becomes a restriction of the equitable power of the
courts, rather than a mere balancing of the equities between the parties.
It is a rule of restraint limiting the remedial authority of the lower courts.
The assumption of the overzealous court gone astray is clear in
Jenkins, where the majority takes the lower court to task for its
indulgence in designing plaintiffs' wish-list relief.233  The Court
commented that the lower court's injunction had been described as the
"most ambitious and expensive remedial program in the history of school
desegregation." '234 It found that excessive relief awarded in the past to
encourage public school attractiveness and counteract white flight-such
as a planetarium and a United Nations room-was judicial policymaking
rather than proper remedial decisionmaking 35 As Justice O'Connor
articulated in her concurrence, "[t]he necessary restrictions on our
jurisdiction and authority contained in Article III of the Constitution
limit the judiciary's institutional capacity to prescribe palliatives for
societal ills. 
'236
Justice Thomas, in his concurring opinion, was more direct in his
attack on the lower court. 37 He urged the adoption of a proportionality
rule to restrain such unacceptable use of judicial authority:
It is perhaps not surprising that broad equitable powers have crept into
our jurisprudence, for they vest judges with the discretion to escape the
constraints and dictates of the law and legal rules. But I believe that we
must impose more precise standards and guidelines on the federal
232. Id. at 226. Stevens found the Court's legalistic distinction based on law and equity to be
unpersuasive. Id. at 225-26.
233. 515 U.S. 70,78(995).
234. Id. (citing Jenkins v. Missouri, i9 F.3d 393, 397 (8th Cir. 1994) (Beam, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc)).
235. See id. at 79, 98-99; see also id. at 83 (noting the dissenting appellate judge's conclusion that
the case "'involves an exercise in pedagogical sociology, not constitutional adjudication' (quoting
Jenkins, 19 F.3 d at 404 (Beam, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc))).
236. Id. at 112-13 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
237. See id. at 125 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas stated: "The judicial overreaching we
see before us today perhaps is the price we now pay for our approval of such extraordinary remedies
in the past.... Judges have directed or managed the reconstruction of entire institutions and
bureaucracies, with little regard for the inherent limitations on their authority." Id. at 125-26.
November 2007]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
equitable power.., to restore predictability to the law and reduce
judicial discretion."'
Justice Thomas situated the factual debate in the larger critique of
lower court activism, arguing that courts had more generally veered from
the narrow course of remedying wrongs.239 Challenging all structural and
public law relief as improper, this larger criticism reprimands courts for
assuming the role of legislatures by essentially enacting policy through
the award of broad injunctive relief extending beyond the contours of the
case. 24" The theory exemplified by Thomas' concurrence is a federalist
critique asserting that courts usurp legislative authority by making policy
through the use of remedial authority. It takes on legal theorists like
Professors Fiss and Chayes, who in the 1970s argued that the courts
should disconnect right from remedy in order to implement moral justice
through remedial power and structural injunctions. 4' Fiss and Chayes
argued for remedies that were broader than the legal right in order to
elaborate and instill new legal norms of social justice. The federalist
critique attacks the ability of lower courts to award any type of structural
relief beyond correcting the specific past harm.42 Proportionality thus has
become a doctrinal rule to discredit public law injunctions and
implement a policy against alleged judicial activism.
This same attack on overzealous courts has appeared as a motivating
factor guiding proportionality analysis in recent cases in the Supreme
Court. For example, in eBay, the Court chastised the Federal Circuit for
altering the centuries-old doctrinal rule of balancing the interests to
determine injunctive relief.43 The Federal Circuit asserted its authority to
prioritize patent rights above other legal rights by adopting a categorical
rule of presumptively granting injunctive relief to patent holders."4 Such
zeal was quickly curtailed by a unanimous Court, which focused on the
appellate court's inappropriate assertion of power and authority.45
238. Id. at 133.
239. Id. at 131-33 (citing Paul Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
949 (i978) and Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30
STAN. L. REV. 661 (1978)).
240. See, e.g., John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor's Foot? The Inherent Remedial
Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1121, 1123 (1996) ("[Tjhe essential flaw of judicial
management is that the Constitution does not permit the federal courts to exercise their remedial
powers to engage in the structural reform of local institutions and local government.").
241. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281,
1302, 1315-16 (1976); Fiss, supra note 179, at i.
242. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996) (asserting that the actual injury requirement of
standing generally limits injunctions to remedy the injury in fact); Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 133 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
243. See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1841 (2o06).
244. See id.
245. See id. at 184o-41; id. at 1841-42 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (agreeing with the rejection of an
automatic grant of injunction, but arguing that plaintiff patent holders were historically granted such
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The critique of a lower court also dominates the Court's decision in
the infamous case of Bush v. Gore.24 In Bush, the Court struck down the
Florida Supreme Court's remedy for the undercounting of votes in a
presidential election where the Florida court ordered the manual recount
of votes in designated counties. 4 The Court found the injunctive remedy
to be both arbitrary and disproportional."' It reacted to the Florida
Supreme Court's zealous assertion of remedial power. As Professor
Andrew Siegel surmises, the Justices in the majority noted, "in addition
to simply taking jurisdiction over this crucial national issue, the Florida
Supreme Court had also cheerfully taken up the role of grand equitable
umpire, vesting itself with the power to craft ad hoc remedial solutions to
a problem the legislature had not fully contemplated."249
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg
and Breyer, argued that the majority's distrust of the remedial power of
lower courts threatened the rule of law:
What must underlie petitioners' entire federal assault on the Florida
election procedures is an unstated lack of confidence in the impartiality
and capacity of the state judges who would make the critical decisions
if the vote count were to proceed.... The endorsement of that position
by the majority of this Court can only lend credence to the most
cynical appraisal of the work of judges throughout the land. It is
confidence in the men and women who administer the judicial system
that is the true backbone of the rule of law.... Although we may never
know with complete certainty the winner of this year's Presidential
election, the identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It is the Nation's
confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law. 5
Bush v. Gore is thus another example where the remedial balance of
requests for injunctive relief).
246. 531 U.S. 98 (2ooo); see Siegel, supra note 99, at 1181-82. Professor Siegel argues that while
Bush v. Gore might be explained by some of the Justices' initial animosity to the political result of the
Florida Court's decision, there was also "something deeper and more visceral at work." id. at 1181.
The Court displayed "a fundamental hostility toward the role the Florida Supreme Court took upon
itself.... [T]he majority Justices likely saw a lower court advocating the primacy of a litigation
solution to a contentious public debate." Id.
247. Bush, 531 U.S. at ii.
248. The Court found the recount remedy to be arbitrary because it failed to adopt uniform
standards for designating a valid legal vote. Id. at xo6. It found the remedy to be disproportional
because it ordered recounts for overvotes (those ballots for which two votes were made) when the
established legal violation addressed undervotes (those votes placed that were not tabulated by the
machines). Id. at 1o7-o9. But see Tracy A. Thomas, Understanding Prophylactic Remedies Through the
Looking Glass of Bush v. Gore, II WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 343, 388-98 (2002) (arguing that the
Supreme Court's suggested remedy of requiring detailed safeguards for the recount and changes in the
voting laws was disproportional).
249. Siegel, supra note 99, at 1182 ("For many-perhaps most-Justices throughout our history,
the role assumed by the Florida justices might not have seemed extraordinary. But for the five Justices
who drove the tempo and timbre of the Rehnquist Court agenda, the Florida Supreme Court's
embrace of such a role was a provocative act, one guaranteed to raise their hackles.").
250. Bush, 531 U.S. at 128-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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proportionality was skewed by the perception of the implementing court
as not deserving of credit for effectuating justice. The Florida court was
undeserving of deference because of its attempt to control a national
election beyond the contours of its state power.
The most recent U.S. Supreme Court cases on injunctive relief thus
reveal prevalent judicial concerns for defendants and the potential
consequences of disproportionate awards of injunctive relief. Seeking a
balance between the plaintiff's deficiency and the potential excess, the
Court has tilted the balance in favor of respecting defendants' interests in
the computation of judicial redress. Factoring in a distrust for
overzealous courts, the Supreme Court has been vigilant in strictly
scrutinizing the injunctive relief developed by these courts, rather than
according them traditional deference under a weak proportionality
standard. This same use of strict remedial proportionality appears in the
Court's cases addressing legislative remedies enacted under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
C. CONGRUENT AND PROPORTIONAL LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES UNDER
SECTION 5
Statutory remedies enacted by Congress under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment offer another example of the Court's move
towards remedial proportionality. Section 5 provides that Congress may
"enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions" of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Court has defined this to be only a limited
"remedial," rather than a general substantive, power.25" ' The scope of
these legislative remedies has been determined by the Court to parallel
that of judicial remedies, and thus these Section 5 remedies add to the
remedial story told by the cases on punitive damages and injunctions
previously discussed. 5 Searching for the measure of appropriate relief
under Section 5, the Court has adopted a principle of proportionality to
251. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 521 (I997).
252. Tracy A. Thomas, The Prophylactic Remedy: Normative Principles and Definitional
Parameters of Broad Injunctive Relief, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 301, 336 (2004) [hereinafter Thomas,
Prophylactic Remedy]; see also Hamilton & Schoenbrod, supra note 9, at 469; Thomas, supra note I I,
at 7o6-o7; Zoller, supra note 3, at 578-80. Many legal scholars have criticized the Court's adoption of a
remedial standard for Section 5, arguing for a broader legislative power. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR.,
NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER: THE SUPREME COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES 148 (2002) (arguing that
Section 5 should not be equated with judicial power since the Fourteenth Amendment assigns no
enforcement role to the Court); Evan H. Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Section
5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1127 (2001) (arguing that Section 5 should be interpreted according
to tests for general Article I power); Ruth Colker, The Supreme Court's Historical Errors in City of
Boerne v. Flores, 43 B.C. L. REV. 783, 786 (2002) (claiming that the Supreme Court made significant
historical errors in interpreting Section 5 as a remedial rather than interpretive authority); James W.
Fox Jr., Re-readings and Misreadings: Slaughter-House, Privileges or Immunities, and Section Five




gauge the proper scope of remedial legislation, requiring that the
legislation exhibit "congruence and proportionality between the injury to
be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end.' ' 53 A
"congruent and proportional" legislative remedy is one that
demonstrates congruence between the means used and the ends to be
achieved, and is not "so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or
preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or
designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior." '254 Using this balancing
framework, the Court reviews Section 5 legislation to make sure it is
appropriately tailored and not excessive. As discussed below, the
proportionality review is built upon a distrust of Congress and the
perceived threat to the Court's ultimate power to define the
constitutional law.
I. A Series of Disproportionate Events
In six cases over five years, the Supreme Court uniformly struck
down Section 5 legislation in every case it reviewed, consistently finding
that the congressional actions at issue were disproportionate to the
targeted harm. 55 Congress' failure to target its prophylactic legislation at
an identified constitutional right proved to be the downfall of the
legislation in most of these cases."' Congress seemed to be resisting the
remedial contours of its designated power by attempting to redefine
substantive constitutional rights.
The development of a proportionality principle in the Section 5
context was thus guided by a distrust of Congress and structural concerns
253. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
254. Id. at 532.
255. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001) (Title I of the Americans
with Disabilities Act); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 625-27 (2000) (Violence Against
Women Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 86, 91 (2000) (Age Discrimination in
Employment Act); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
674 (I999) (Trademark Remedy Clarification Act); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v.
Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 647-48 (i999) (Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy
Clarification Act); City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532, 536 (Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
256. See Thomas, Prophylactic Remedy, supra note 252, at 338-39, 338 n.16o (discussing cases). For
example, in City of Boerne, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act was invalidated because it
targeted the non-constitutional harms of zoning, land-use, and fair housing laws. 521 U.S. at 535. In
Morrison, Congress misdirected its legislative aim when it sought to remedy the common-law assault
claims of domestic violence lacking constitutional protection. 529 U.S. at 625-26. And in both Garrett
and Kimel, Congress targeted employment practices not prohibited by the federal Constitution.
Garrett, 531 U.S. at 366-72; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91. College Savings and Florida Prepaid similarly struck
down legislation not targeted at a constitutional right. Coll. Sav., 527 U.S. at 674 (invalidating
Trademark Remedy Clarification Act because Congress attempted to remedy the non-constitutional,
common torts of unfair competition and false advertising); Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 643 (999)
(invalidating Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act which provides remedies
for negligent patent infringement, whereas constitutional Due Process is implicated only by intentional
patent infringement that is not adequately redressed by the state).
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regarding interaction among Congress, the Court, and the states. '57 In
one respect, the Court has suspected that disproportionate, excessive
remedies create a windfall to Congress in allowing it to enact legislation
beyond its enumerated power."' Section 5, the Court has held, does not
authorize substantive legislation regarding legal rights, but only remedial
legislation responding to existing or threatened violations of
constitutional rights. '59 Excessive remedies under Section 5 threaten to
exceed the authorized scope of legislative power: "If Congress were
permitted to enact rules that it calls 'prophylactic' without any
proportionality review, it could increase its power under Section 5
geometrically. '' '6  Proportionality review thus helps to maintain the
proper separation of powers at the federal level:
The relation between proportionality and separation of powers should
be underscored. It is fundamental to theories of limited government
that government bodies cannot be trusted to impose and observe
limitations on their own powers. Accordingly, limitations on power
must come from outside the body that exercises power-from the
people and from other government institutions. So proportionality as a
limit on (for example) legislative power cannot be left to legislative
,6determination.
26
Secondly, the Court expressed a structural concern with Congress
usurping the Court's power to interpret the Constitution. "[I]t falls to this
Court, not Congress, to define the substance of constitutional guarantees.
The ultimate interpretation and determination of the Fourteenth
Amendment's substantive meaning remains the province of the Judicial
Branch.',,6, Commentators have thus concluded that the "Court now
views Section 5 power as a potential threat to the Court's role as 'the
ultimate expositor of the constitutional text. ' '23 The Court's
proportionality approach reflects its "insistence on primacy in defining
constitutional rights .. .[and] unwillingness to defer to Congress' own
decisions how to wield its remedial power. ' '
257. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 523-24; William D. Araiza, The Section 5 Power After
Tennessee v. Lane, 32 PsP'. L. REV. 39, 40 (2004).
258. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532 (finding the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 to
be "so out of proportion" to the objective under the Free Exercise Clause that it could be understood
only as an attempt to work a "substantive change in constitutional protections").
259. Id. at 519-20.
260. Hamilton & Schoenbrod, supra note 9, at 487.
261. Ristroph, supra note 47, at 287.
262. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003) (quoting Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 8i (2ooo)); see also Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509,539 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) (stating that proportionality test of Section 5 is to ensure that Congress does not usurp the
Court's responsibility to define the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment).
263. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power:
Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE LJ. 1943, 1945 (2003)
(quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 n.7 (2ooo)) (referring to the Rehnquist Court).
264. Araiza, supra note 257.
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The Court has also articulated a third structural concern of vertical
federalism and Congress' potential encroachment upon states' rights. In
the Section 5 context, the Court has endorsed state sovereignty as
important to the proportionality calculus? 6' Thus, the Court struck down
legislation as disproportionate because it lacked a causal nexus to the
identified constitutional harm, and therefore intruded into the
governance prerogatives of the states.26 This states' rights agenda
dominated much of the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence, both within
and outside of the remedial cases. Indeed, the dominant narrative of
commentators on the Rehnquist Court "tells the story of a Court
obsessed with issues of federalism and, more specifically, dedicated to
recalibrating the balance between federal and state powers so as limit




Given the overriding structural concerns guiding the Court's Section
5 jurisprudence, proportionality was conceptualized as a rule of
federalism, renewing the historical primacy of states' rights.
Commentators attacked the proportionality standard as a mere pretext
for judicial activism and a mechanism to implement the views of the
conservative Justices on the Court.26 Then, surprisingly, in 2003, the
Court upheld legislation under Section 5 for the first time in nearly forty
years.
2. Double Take: Upholding Proportional Legislation
The Court changed course in Nevada v. Hibbs, when it upheld
legislation under Section 5 for the first time in recent history.z6 In Hibbs,
the Court upheld the Family and Medical Leave Act's ("FMLA") private
damages provision for employees denied the opportunity to take leave
from work to care for a family member. 7 ° Just one year later, the Court
again upheld legislation under Section 5, affirming Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act in Tennessee v. Lane."' Commentators
265. Id. (stating that the post-Boerne cases reflected the Court's "continuing suspicion of
congressional power and, conversely, its solicitude for state sovereignty"); Thomas W. Beimers,
Searching for the Structural Vision of City of Boerne v. Flores: Vertical and Horizontal Tensions in the
New Constitutional Architecture, 26 HASTINOS CONsT. L.Q. 789, 828 (1999) (discussing the federalist
concerns driving the Section 5 cases).
266. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368-72 (2oo) (invalidating the
Americans with Disabilities Act because the evidence of private employment discrimination failed to
show any connection to state employers); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598, 625-26 (20oo)
(striking down the Violence Against Women Act, in part, because of the lack of evidence showing
gender-based disparate treatment by state authorities).
267. Siegel, supra note 99, at t ioo.
268. K.G. Jan Pillai, Incongruent Disproportionality, 29 HASriNGS CONST. L.Q. 645, 647 (2002).
269. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 725 (2003). The last time the Court upheld
Section 5 legislation was in 1966 in Katzenbach v. Morgan when it upheld legislation prohibiting
literacy tests for voting. 384 U.S. 641, 658 (1966).
270. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 725.
271. 541 U.S. 509 (20o4).
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once again cried foul, this time intimating that only the personal
proclivities of the Justices explained the differences in outcomes.2 72 The
Court, however, would claim that it had finally come across legislation
that was appropriately proportionate to the identified harm.
The two cases shared one attribute that seemed to distinguish them
from the prior Section 5 cases. In Hibbs and Lane, the legislation
implicated the operation of a strong, fundamental right that had
previously been identified and enforced by the Court.73 The Court
defined the scope of the "harm" more broadly in these cases than in
prior cases by identifying legal rights that were at the top of the judicial
hierarchy of protection-gender equality (Hibbs) and access to the
courts (Lane).74 Under a proportionality balance, a strong, broadly
defined right supports the imposition of strong, broadly defined
remedies.
Hibbs was a relatively easy application of the Section 5
proportionality rule. 75 In a six to three decision authored by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, the Court upheld the Family and Medical Leave Act and its
authorization of private damages against state employers.7 6 The FMLA
targeted unconstitutional gender discrimination in the workplace and
enacted prophylactic measures specifying twelve-week unpaid family
leave for both sexes to address adverse employment action taken against
women. 77 The Court found the FMLA to be proportionate to the harm
because its broad scope of including men and mandating specific times
addressed widespread gender discrimination and the potential reactions
from recalcitrant employers to comply with family leave protections for
women.78
Chief Justice Rehnquist, however, changed his vote in Lane,
returning to his former distrust of congressional legislation. 79 The Chief
Justice dissented in the five to four decision on rounds that the
proportionality standard had been grossly misapplied.' Justice Stevens,
writing for the majority, held that the public accommodation provisions
of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") were a valid exercise of
272. See Editorial, A Blow For Equality, ST. Louis POST DISPATCH, June 1, 2003, at B2 ("Chief
Justice Rehnquist, rumored to be considering retirement, may have had his eye on his place in history
in softening the edges of his regressive legacy.").
273. See Araiza, supra note 257, at 41-42.
274. See id. at 41.
275. Id. at 41-42; see also Thomas, supra note II, at 730-33 (predicting that FMLA would be
sustained under proportionality test of Section 5).
276. Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721,725 (2003).
277. Id.; 29 U.S.C. §§ 260I(b)(4), 2612(a)(i)(C) (2000).
278. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 735-37.
279. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 538 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
28o. See id. at 539.
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Section 5 power."' The majority identified the operative constitutional
right as the fundamental right of access to the courts, rather than the
lower-level equal protection right against disability discrimination.l2 The
plaintiffs in the case, a disabled criminal defendant and a court reporter,
were wheelchair bound paraplegics who had been denied access to a
public courthouse."3 The majority placed these specific constitutional
violations into context by setting them "against a backdrop of pervasive
unequal treatment" in the administration of public services and programs
including marriage, voting, and juror service.284 This expansive scope of
harm against the disabled, according to the majority, balanced the broad
scope of the remedy enacted by Congress prohibiting the exclusion or
denial of benefits to a disabled person in the provision of any public
services and programs."5 Moreover, the majority emphasized the
particularly tailored and limited scope of the ADA remedial
legislation. 86 Congress required only that "reasonable accommodations"
be made for the disabled, and did not require a public entity to do
everything possible.287 The narrow scope of the enacted remedy coupled
with the broad scope of the identified harm established the proportional
balance needed to uphold the legislation.
Chief Justice Rehnquist was incensed by the inartful application of
the proportionality standard.28 "While the Court today pays lipservice to
the 'congruence and proportionality' test, it applies it in a manner
inconsistent with our recent precedent. 's9 He faulted the majority for
attempting to "rig the congruence-and-proportionality test by artificially
constricting the scope of the statute to closely mirror a recognized
constitutional right.""9 He criticized the majority for selecting the
fundamental right of access to the courts as the operative right, but
relying upon evidence of widespread discrimination against the disabled
in non-court settings like marriage, voting, and public education to justify
the law. 9' Rehnquist found "nothing in the legislative record or statutory
findings to indicate that disabled persons were systematically denied" the
281. Id. at 533-34 (majority opinion). Title II of the ADA prohibits any public entity from
discriminating against "qualified" persons with disabilities in the provision or operation of public
serices, programs or activities. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131--2165 (2000 & Supp. 2004).
282. Lane, 541 U.S. at 523. Unquestionably, this cautious choice of the operative right was done to
retain the vote of Justice O'Connor, who invalidated the legislation in Garrett, Florida Prepaid,
Morrison, and Kimel. Araiza, supra note 257, at 46.
283. Lane, 541 U.S. at 5 13-14.
284. Id. at 524.
285. Id. at 531.
286. Id. at 532.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 539 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting, joined by Kennedy and Thomas, JJ.).
289. Id.
290. Id. at 551.
291. Id. at 541.
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right of access to the courts. 92 Given the "near-total lack of actual
constitutional violations in the congressional record," the dissenters
would have invalidated the remedial legislation as in Board of Trustees v.
Garrett.93  Rehnquist also criticized Congress for the "massive
overbreadth" of the remedial legislation that covered a panoply of rights,
including access to amusement parks and hockey games, extending far
beyond the scope of the plaintiffs' rights to the courts
94
Commentators have generally attacked the Court's application of
proportionality in the Section 5 cases as nothing more than conservative
politics.295 It is true that three Justices (Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas)
have consistently voted to invalidate legislation. And two others (Justices
Souter and Breyer) have consistently voted to affirm legislation.
However, four Justices (Stevens, Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Ginsburg)
have switched sides during these cases. Professor William Araiza
explained the difference in the recent cases as one of "mood," finding
that "while Lane's actual review of the evidence is not marked by any
self-conscious alteration of pre-existing law, that review surely reveals a
more lenient mood than does the analogous review in Garrett and
previous cases."2' The Court, however, has explained the variation as
nothing more than the proper operation of the proportionality rule,
which serves to ferret out inappropriate remedies while upholding those
which are properly tailored.
D. THE EXCEPTION TO THE RULE: JUSTICE SCALIA REJECTS
PROPORTIONALITY
Justice Scalia stands as the one Justice who expressly rejects
remedial proportionality. In all civil remedial contexts (save injunctions),
Scalia has refused to apply the proportionality standard. Citing the
inherent subjectivity of proportionality, he has disavowed it as
"insusceptible of principled application."" 9
In the punitive damages cases, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice
Thomas, criticized the use of remedial proportionality, arguing that it is
"constrained by no principle other than the Justices' subjective
assessment of the 'reasonableness' of the award in relation to the
292. Id. at 543.
293. Id. at 547.
294. Id. at 550-51 .
295. See Rosalie Berger Levinson, Will the New Federalism be the Legacy of the Rehnquist Court?,
40 VAL. U. L. REv. 589, 595 (2006) ("The Court's reliance on federalism thus appears suspect. Rather
than being liberty enhancing, the decisions appear to simply promote a conservative agenda ...."
(footnote omitted)); Pillai, supra note 268; Post & Siegel, supra note 263, at 1949 (suggesting that "the
decisions of the Rehnquist Court have been driven by implicit policy preferences").
296. Araiza, supra note 257, at 49.
297. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 4o8, 429 (2o03) (Scalia, J., dissenting):
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 599 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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conduct for which it was assessed."' 8 Elaborating on the subjectivity,
Scalia attacked the Court's use of proportionality analysis, claiming it
reflected "a judgment about the appropriate degree of indignation or
outrage, which is hardly an analytical determination."'
In truth, the "guideposts" mark a road to nowhere; they provide no
real guidance at all .... One expects the Court to conclude: "To thine
own self be true."
These crisscrossing platitudes yield no real answers in no real
cases.... The Court has constructed a framework that does not
genuinely constrain, that does not inform state legislatures and lower
courts-that does nothing at all except confer an artificial air of
doctrinal analysis upon its essentially ad hoc determination that this
particular award of punitive damages was not "fair."'30
The claims against proportionality for punitive damages proffered
by Scalia and Thomas are bound up in their position that the
Constitution does not protect against excessive amounts of awards."'
Rather than federal review of state awards, the dissenting Justices would
defer to the jury as to the proper measure of relief, subject to weak
judicial review by state courts for reasonableness. 2
Similarly, in Hibbs and Lane Justice Scalia rejected the remedial
proportionality standard, despite his acknowledged adherence to the rule
in the previous litany of Section 5 cases.3"3 Scalia thus found himself
dissenting from the Court's decision upholding legislative remedial
programs. This result is ironic given Scalia's jurisprudential belief in
deference to the legislative branches, and in Congress as the most
democratic of the three governmental branches.3 4 In Lane, Scalia
reasserted those deferential proclivities on a larger scale, rejecting the
proportionality review altogether in the Section 5 context. 5
I yield to the lessons of experience. The "congruence and
proportionality" standard, like all such flabby tests, is a standing
invitation to judicial arbitrariness and policy-driven decisionmaking.
Worse still, it casts this Court in the role of Congress's taskmaster.
298. Gore, 517 U.S. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
299. Id. at 6oo.
300. Id. at 605-o6.
301. Id.at 599 ("The Constitution provides no warrant for federalizing yet another aspect of our
Nation's legal culture (no matter how much in need of correction it may be) .... ); id. at 598 ("Since
the Constitution does not make that any of our business, the Court's activities in this area are an
unjustified incursion into the province of state governments.").
302. Id. at 598-99.
303. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 556 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Nev. Dep't of Human Res.
v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 72, 744 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
304. See generally RALPH A. RossuM, ANTONIN SCALIA'S JURISPRUDENCE (2006) (describing Scalia's
jurisprudential style, beliefs, principles, and legacy).
305. Lane, 541 U.S. at 561-62 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia indicated he would refuse to apply the
proportionality test in any Section 5 case, except for those based on race discrimination, which he
distinguished based on the history and principal purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
November 2007]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Under it, the courts (and ultimately this Court) must regularly check
Congress's homework to make sure that it has identified sufficient
constitutional violations to make its remedy congruent and
proportional. As a general matter, we are ill advised to adopt or adhere
to constitutional rules that bring us into constant conflict with a
coequal branch of Government. 6
Such engagement with Congress was exacerbated, Scalia said, by the
use of a test that "cannot objectively be shown to have been met or
failed."3 Thus, his rejection of proportionality was driven in part by its
inherent subjectivity. As Scalia explained, "I have generally rejected tests
based on such malleable standards as 'proportionality,' because they
have a way of turning into vehicles for the implementation of individual
judges' policy preferences."""
This disavowal parallels Justice Scalia's rejection of proportionality
in the criminal context. He has rejected proportionality review of
criminal sentences altogether, finding the oversight of criminal
punishments to be inherently subjective and incapable of intelligent
application.3" While Scalia is thus consistent in his rejection of
proportionality, the Court is not. Many commentators have addressed
the inconsistencies between the Court's escalation of proportionality
review for civil remedies and its rejection of the strict standard for
criminal sanctions.30 The Court's experience with the strict
proportionality standard over several decades in the criminal context led
it to conclude that such a standard was too malleable to provide
sufficient meaning and guidance."' Instead, the majority of the Court
adopted a weak proportionality standard for reviewing punishments in
non-capital cases.3 2 This weak standard of "gross disproportionality"
examines sentences only to see if they are extreme, rather than carefully
calibrated, and reversal is reserved for the rare case."3 Justice Kennedy,
in his concurring opinion in Harmelin v. Michigan, explained: "The
Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between the
crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are
306. Id. at 557-58.
307. Id. at 558.
308. Id. at 556.
309. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 31 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501
U.S. 957, 986 (i99 I ) (arguing that Eighth Amendment strict proportionality review is "an invitation to
the imposition of subjective values").
31o. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1051 (2004);
Frase. supra note 42. at 6o7-o9; Karlan, supra note 102, at 88o; Ristroph, supra note 47. at 267; Rachel
A. Van Cleave, Death is Different, is Money? Criminal v. Punitives and Proportionality, 12 S. CAL.
ImrERDisc. L.J. 217. 219-20 (2003): Adam Gershowitz, Note, The Supreme Court's Backwards
Proportionality Jurisprudence: Comparing Judicial Review of Excessive Criminal Punishments and
Excessive Punitive Damages, 86 VA. L. REV. 1249. 1274 (2000).
311 . Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72-73 (2003).
312. Id. at 72; Ewing, 538 U.S. at 20 (plurality opinion).
313. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 73.
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grossly disproportionate to the crime."3 4  Applying the gross
disproportionality standard, the Court has upheld sentences of twenty-
five years to life for recidivists stealing three golf clubs '5 or $150 in
videos.36
Similarly, in the excessive fines case of United States v. Bajakajian,
Justice Thomas explained that the principle of proportionality in criminal
law requires that "[t]he amount of the forfeiture bear some relationship
to the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish. '317 He
acknowledged that "just how proportional to a criminal offense a fine
must be will be inherently imprecise.' 33 This imprecision, he explained,
justified the adoption of a gross disproportionality standard, rather than
a strict standard mandating precise proportionality of a sentence.1 9
Under this standard, the defendant's fine of $357,144, the full amount of
the cash he failed to declare when leaving the country, was held to be
grossly disproportionate to the statutory fine of $5,000.3" Thus, Justice
Thomas seems to accept some level of proportionality review for
criminal sanctions despite his rejection of such a rule for punitive
damages.
Despite its experience with the difficulties of proportionality analysis
in the criminal context, the Court continues to embrace proportionality
review of civil remedies. Indeed, the Court, other than Justice Scalia and
perhaps Justice Thomas, appears willing to rely increasingly on
proportionality in the context of remedies. Exploring the Court's
motivations for the proportionality principle in remedies, it appears that
the Court is determined to continue on its current course.
III. JUSTIFYING PROPORTIONAL REMEDIES
The Supreme Court has not expressly articulated the reasons why it
has embraced proportionality as the judicial standard for assessing the
appropriateness of relief. Yet woven through its decisions are clues to the
motivations guiding the Justices in their near-universal adoption of
314. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at iooi (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(upholding in a 5-4 decision a first-time offender's sentence of life in prison for possession of 672
grams of cocaine).
315. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28, 30-31 (plurality opinion).
316. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 77. In fact, in only one modern case has the Court struck down a prison
sentence as disproportionate. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983) (striking down sentence of
life in prison for petty criminal with six prior minor felonies for writing bad check for $too): see also
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 382 (i9io) (invalidating Philippine penalty in part for its
disproportionality).
317. 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998). While Justice Thomas endorsed the proportionality standard for
excessive fines in Bajakajian, he rejected all proportionality review for criminal sentences as he joined
Justice Scalia's dissent in Ewing. 538 U.S. at 32 (Thomas. J., concurring in the judgment).
318. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 335-36.
319. Id. at 336-37.
320. Id. at 339-40.
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proportionality for remedies. Implicit in the decisions are concerns about
structural and legal integrity that seem to be motivating the Court. Three
justifications emerge from reading between the lines of these cases: the
need for objectivity in decisionmaking, the belief in judicial restraint and
minimalism, and the curtailment of excessive litigation and remedies. All
three of these justifications lead to limiting the exercise of the remedial
power, whether that relief stems from the lower courts, juries, or
Congress.
These three implicit justifications for the proportionality rule mirror
the core concerns embodied in the international norm of proportionality:
rationality, restraint, and reciprocity.32 ' These "three Rs" define the core
of proportionality analysis and provide guidance in evaluating
governmental action.322  When considering the rationality of a
governmental action, international courts first evaluate whether the
action is appropriate, arbitrary, unfair, or based on irrational
considerations.323 International courts then ask whether the governmental
response is restrained, taking into account the availability of less
restrictive alternatives.3 4  Finally, international courts look for
reciprocity, or proper fit between the harm and the judicial measure.3 5
Together, these three Rs create a rule of minimal governmental action.
These same three global principles are reflected in the U.S. Supreme
Court's own homegrown version of remedial proportionality. The three
Rs provide an organizational framework for understanding the Court's
justifications for remedial proportionality. The principle of rationality is
embodied in the Court's emphasis on an objective, logical standard to
constrain biased decisionmaking. The principle of restraint is seen in the
Court's embrace of judicial minimalism and preference for the least-
restrictive remedy. And the principle of reciprocity is evident in the
Court's concerns with defendants being asked to respond to a wrong with
a remedy in excess of the amount of harm caused.
There is, however, one crucial distinction between the international
norm of proportionality and the U.S. Supreme Court's remedial
proportionality rule. While the rest of the world uses proportionality to
protect plaintiffs, the Supreme Court uses proportionality to insulate
defendants. On the international level, the norm of proportionality is
generally used to protect plaintiffs against governmental intrusion.36
321. Jackson, SUpra note 3, at 805-06; Zoller, supra note 3, at 582.
322. Zoller. supra note 3, at 582 n.83.
323. Jackson, supra note 3, at 8o5-o6; Zoller, supra note 3, at 582.
324. Gunn, supra note 3, at 467; Jackson, supra note 3, at 805-06; Zoller, supra note 3, at 582.
325. Gunn. supra note 3. at 467: Jackson. supra note 3, at 805-06; Zoller. supra note 3, at 582.
326. Jackson, supra note 3, at 804-05: Zoller, supra note 3. See generally THE PRINCIPLE OF
PROPORTIONALITY IN THE LAWS OF EUROPE (Evelyn Ellis ed. 1999); NICHOLAS EMILIOU, THE PRINCIPLE OF
PROPORTIONALITY IN EUROPEAN LAW (1996); Richard Clayton. Regaining a Sense of Proportion: The
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Proportionality is used as a mechanism of judicial review to prevent
exercises of excessive legislative and executive power that infringe on
individual rights.2 7 Conversely, the remedial proportionality principle of
the Supreme Court is used to curtail excessive judicial intrusions into the
interests of government and corporate defendants."" Both approaches
share a theory of limited government, but the American approach
applies this theory to benefit only defendants. It encourages, rather than
prevents, the trumping of governmental interests to outweigh individual
rights, thus turning the principle of individual freedom on its head.
This section seeks to flesh out the reasons why an Americanized
remedial proportionality principle has emerged. Viewing the cases from
the Court's perspective, this section lays out the justifications given by
the Court for its adoption of a rule of proportional relief.
A. RATIONALITY: THE PURSUIT OF OBJECTIVITY
The Court believes that the proportionality standard in remedies
provides an objective judicial measurement that ensures the rationality
of judicial decisions. Rationality seeks a logical basis for legal reasoning
that is not based on arbitrary, unfair, or biased grounds. In the punitive
damages cases, for example, the Court has been concerned with punitives
based on jury bias rather than "objective" measures.3"9  The
proportionality standard injects an objective standard into the judicial
decisionmaking process, providing a logical basis for remedial decisions.
The Court, perhaps like many lay people, assumes that judicial discretion
is potentially unbounded. As the old legal maxim states, "equity is as
long as a chancellor's foot," meaning that what is "fair" varies randomly
from judge to judge.33
This search for objectivity was the crux of the judicial debate in
TXO, in which the Court first began to consider a proportionality
standard for punitive damages.33' The perceived need for an objective
standard to avoid caprice and bias in decisionmaking was the guiding
principle that steered the Court towards the eventual adoption of a
remedial proportionality rule. The Justices and the parties recognized the
importance of an objective standard; they simply disagreed as to whether
Human Rights Act and the Proportionality Principle, 5 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 504 (2001).
327. Jackson, supra note 3. at 804-05; Ristroph, supra note 47, at 267-69.
328. Zoller, supra note 3, at 585.
329. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443,467 0993) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (expressing concern with a punitive damages award that "reflects
bias, passion, or prejudice on the part of the jury, rather than rational concerns for deterrence and
retribution"); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 87 (1988) (O'Connor, J.. concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) ("Punitive damages are not measured against actual injury, so
there is no objective standard that limits their amount.").
330. Yoo, supra note 240 , at 1121.
331- 509 U.S. 443.
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the standard was quantitative, qualitative, or both.332 Justice O'Connor
explained the need for objective rules of decision to avoid "arbitrariness,
caprice, passion, bias, and even malice [that] can replace reasoned
judgment and law as the basis for jury decisionmaking." '333 She then
pushed the Court to develop specific objective factors to further refine
such decisionmaking:
As an initial matter, constitutional judgments should not be, or appear
to be, merely the subjective views of individual Justices. Without
objective criteria on which to rely, almost any decision regarding
proportionality will be a matter of personal preference. One judge's
excess very well may be another's moderation. To avoid that element
of subjectivity, our judgments should be informed by objective factors
to the maximum possible extent.34
The Court thus developed objective factors to further direct the
exercise of proportionality review. The Court enunciated several three-
part tests to approach the proportionality decision in a logical fashion.
For injunctions, the proportionality review must measure the scope of
the harm, match the scope of relief, and account for the interests of state
defendants.335 For punitive damages, the Court must-follow the "three
guideposts" of evaluation: the reprehensibility of the conduct, the
amount of compensatory damages, and the availability of other
sanctions.33 And for Section 5 remedies, the Court must identify the
contours of the constitutional right at issue, identify the evidence in
support of a history of demonstrated harms, and evaluate the proper
scope of a congruent and proportional remedy.337 In each case, the Court
is simply elaborating on the basic balancing concept of matching the
scope of the remedy to the scope of the harm. The establishment of
additional objective factors aims to define the proportionality'standard
and standardize the judicial decisionmaking.
Proportionality thus purports to provide the transparency of reason
332. Petitioners argued for a qualitative, comparative test to other punitive awards. Id. at 455.
Kennedy concurred in favor of an individual qualitative assessment. Id. at 467-68 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). The plurality adopted a quantitative comparison
of punitives to potential harm, id. at 460 (plurality opinion), and O'Connor included both
mathematical and qualitative factors in her standard, id. at 480-82 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). This
debate over a qualitative or quantitative proportionality standard for punitive damages was at issue in
the case of Philip Morris v. Williams, but the Court resolved the dispute on other grounds. 127 S. Ct.
1057 (2007); see discussion infra note 379 and accompanying text.
333. TXO, 509 U.S. at 474-75 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting W. OLsoN, THE LmATION
ExPLOSION 175 (199)).
334. Id. at 48o-8I (internal citation and quotation omitted).
335. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 28o-8I (1977).
336. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campell, 538 U.S 408,418 (2003); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v.
Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996).
337. Tennessee v. Lane. 541 U.S. 509, 538-54 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (clearly laying
out the three-part inquiry developed in prior cases); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531
U.S. 356, 366-67 (2oo).
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to counter the notions of subjective remedial discretion. 15 As Justice
Roberts expressed in his concurrence in eBay, "'[d]iscretion is not whim,
and limiting discretion according to legal standards helps promote the
basic principle of justice that like cases should be decided alike."'339 The
legal principle of proportionality provides transparency by calling for
rational explanations to appear in judicial decisions, thus providing
added legitimacy to the rule of law. Application of the standard and its
attendant factors allows us to view the operation of justice as a
mechanical operation, and thus counters the criticism of judicial
discretion as personal whim. It is the rule's transparency that helps to
maintain the credibility of the rule of law by militating against claims of
bias.
Finally, the assumed objectivity of the proportionality standard is
designed to provide consistency across the judicial system. This perceived
consistency provides the model of a level playfield in the law. For
example, proportionality provides a consistent standard in punitive
damages that the Court says provides adequate notice to defendants of
potential penalties."4° The use of formulas, ratios, and three-factored tests
provides the appearance of objectivity necessary to avoid the caprice of
the decisionmaker. Thus, the proportionality rule emerged in part as an
antidote to biased decisionmaking. Its principle of balanced justice
satisfied the demand for rationality in judicial decisionmaking to
preserve the rule of law.
B. RESTRAINT: A RULE OF JUDICIAL MINIMALISM
The Court has also justified its remedial proportionality test in the
injunctions context as a rule of judicial restraint. The Court has
articulated rules requiring the least restrictive remedy motivated by
proper deference to the legislative and executive branches. This results in
an overarching preference for modest, narrowly tailored remedies that
provide relief to the plaintiff at the least cost or burden to the
defendant.34'
An example of the Court's motivation of remedial judicial restraint
can be seen in Ayotte, where the Court refused to uphold a broad
injunction striking down a New Hampshire abortion law for minors that
impermissibly failed to include an exception for the preservation of the
338. See Vicki C. Jackson. Ambivalent Resistance and Comparative Constitutionalism: Opening Up
the Conversation on "Proportionality," Rights and Federalism, i U. PA. J. CONST. L. 583,617 (1999).
339. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1841 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
340. Gore, 517 U.S. at 587 (Breyer, J., concurring).
341. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr. Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (994); see also Thomas, Prophylactic
Remedy, supra note 252, at 353-61 (discussing prophylactic injunctions as remedies of last resort
following the Court's rule of least restrictive remedy).
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minor's health.342 The Court criticized the courts below for choosing the
"most blunt remedy" rather than more narrowly tailored relief.343 In
vacating the overbroad remedy, the Court announced a general
preference for the least restrictive remedy, mindful of its own limited
institutional competence.344 The Court noted concerns with crafting more
comprehensive remedies because such "line-drawing is inherently
complex" and risks "serious invasion of the legislative domain." '345 The
Ayotte Court thus embraced the remedial rule of proportionality and the
preference for "modest" remedies based on deference to the legislature
and notions of judicial incompetence.34
The Court's reasoning evidences a theory of judicial passivity or
minimalism.347 Justice O'Connor, the author of the unanimous Ayotte
opinion, was the leading minimalist on the Supreme Court.3,8 The
minimalist approach seeks to "reduce the role of judicial lawmaking" and
advance the theme that the Court's power and that of the federal courts
is sharply limited.349 Under this guise, courts are incompetent to craft
remedies for ordinary litigants and must act cautiously, mindful of this
disability.35" The proportionality principle's rule of remedial restraint
advances this theory of limited judicial competence. Whether the cases
are rationalized by federalist notions of respect for the states or
deference to the legislature,3"' the result is that the courts are encouraged
to be more restrained in remedying violations of the law.
The irony is that this belief in the Court's limited competence and
deferential treatment of the legislature does not emerge as a rationale for
the use of remedial proportionality in the cases of punitive damages or
Section 5 remedies. In contrast, the Court in these contexts distrusts the
342. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 323 (2006).
343. Id. at 330.
344. Id. at 329.
345. Id. However, the Court disregarded this command of judicial restraint in its opinion in Bush v.
Gore. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). There, instead of modestly striking down the unconstitutional recount
provisions, as Justices Souter and Breyer advocated, the Court bluntly struck down the entire judicial
remedy and drafted its own, broad substitution remedy. Id. at io (detailing specific steps and
safeguards the Florida Court should have ordered); see Thomas, supra note 248, at 387-98 (arguing
that the Court's suggested remedy was overbroad and unjustified).
346. Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 331.
347. Judicial minimalists favor rulings that are narrow and shallow that "produce outcomes and
rationales on which diverse people can agree, notwithstanding their disagreement on fundamental
issues." Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1899, 1907 (2006).
348. Id.
349. Meltzer, supra note 96, at 343 (arguing that judicial passivity represents "a dramatic departure
from an important tradition in the Anglo-American legal system, one in which courts have a
distinctive responsibility for promoting legal coherence").
350. Judith Resnik, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power,
78 IND. L.J. 223, 225 (2003).
351. All of these theories have been used to explain the jurisprudence of the modern Supreme
Court. See Siegel, supra note 98, at 1 103-14.
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legislature, whether Congressional enactments of new protections or the
state legislatures' failure to enact tort reform.352
The reconciling factor is a broader belief in remedial minimalism
and a hostility to litigation as a means of providing social justice.353 As
Professor Siegel has suggested, the Court appears hostile to litigation and
its remedial rewards as the way of resolving social issues, and thus the
Rehnquist Court's cases have "directly and consistently moved to limit
both access to and the remedial power of the federal courts." '354 For
example, in State Farm, the Court noted that "a more modest
punishment for this reprehensible conduct could have satisfied the
State's legitimate objectives, and the Utah courts should have gone no
further." '355 Thus, as Siegel concludes, "[t]he contentious struggles over
remedial issues that litter the Rehnquist Court's case reports are not
battles over whether the Court should cut back on judicial discretion,
equitable remedies, or litigation-positive interpretive strategies but
instead disputes over how far such a trend should go.,,,, 6 Remedial
minimalism explains the Court's preference for modest judicial relief.
C. RECIPROCITY: CURBING REMEDIAL EXCESS
The third motivation for proportionality found in the remedies cases
is the need for reciprocity between remedy and harm in order to curb
remedial excess. The Court perceives remedial excess in injunctions that
micromanage public institutions, punitives that bankrupt companies, and
windfall recoveries that make attorneys millionaires. Public schools are
ordered to build planetariums,357 and wealthy doctors win millions when
their Beemers are repainted."" The overreaching in many cases has
triggered a rebound effect in which the Court has reacted by crafting a
rule of proportionality to block the excess. Such excess cannot be seen as
reciprocal or corresponding to the proven harm when it fails to match the
scope or gravity of the violation. Reciprocity in which the remedy
provides an equivalent counterpart to the harm restores a sense of
balance to the judicial arena at a time when excess appears to run
rampant.
The first premise behind the reciprocity rationale is the Court's
strong antipathy toward remedial windfalls. The punitive damages cases
are replete with exclamations denouncing the outrageous rise of the
352. See Chemerinsky, supra note 310, at lO62-63 (noting inconsistencies in the Court's deference
to legislatures in criminal sentencing and punitive damages cases); see discussion supra pp. 137-38
(discussing Court's distrust of Congress in Section 5 cases).
353. Resnik, supra note 350, at 224-34; Siegel, supra note 99, at 1097.
354. Siegel, supra note 99, at I 113.
355. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408. 419-20 (2003).
356. Siegel, supra note 99, at 1128.
357. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 78-79 (995).
358. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 567 (1996).
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remedy. Punitives are "skyrocketing," awards are "monstrous," and the
system has "run wild." 3 59 The Court is reacting to a perceived problem of
remedial excess, despite recent scholarship denying the problem."" As
Professor Siegel aptly described, the Court believes "the American
system of compensation for private injuries is desperately out of control,
producing untold riches for plaintiffs' lawyers and mammoth rewards for
a handful of lucky litigants, warping the incentive structures for
businesses and professionals, and causing a concomitant loss of efficiency
and societal wealth.
36 ,
Underlying the reciprocity rationale is a distrust of society's fact
finders. The Court distrusts the juries, judges, and legislatures, believing
that left to their own druthers, these decisionmakers will overreach to the
extent possible. This distrust is evident in the punitive damages context,
where some Justices have expressed fears that uninformed juries biased
against big business will engage in random social redistribution.362 In
public law injunction cases, the distrust is directed against activist judges
who allegedly act to advance their own liberal theories of social justice.363
And in the Section 5 context, the Court suspects that the legislature will
take every opportunity to exceed the boundaries of Section 5 and
legislate broadly for the general welfare, contrary to judicial
interpretations of the Constitution.
6
,
Armed with this distrust, the reciprocal commands of
proportionality impose limits to restore the balance of justice.
Proportionality works as a limitation on the remedy, requiring an
equivalent societal response to wrong. This reciprocity, like the Moseaic
"eye for an eye, tooth for a tooth," demands parallel response and
359. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989) (O'Connor J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Awards of punitive damages are skyrocketing. As recently
as a decade ago, the largest award of punitive damages affirmed by an appellate court in a products
liability case was $250,000. Since then, awards more than 30 times as high have been sustained on
appeal." (citation omitted)); see supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
360. See Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Relation Between Punitive and Compensatory Awards:
Combining Extreme Data with the Mass of Awards 3-4 (Mar. 30, 2007) (unpublished manuscript,
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=929565) (finding no increase in
punitive awards over time); Anthony Sebok, Punitive Damages: From Myth to Theory. 92 IOWA L.
REV. 957, 959-60, 970-73 (2007) (finding studies showing claims of punitive damages as "out of
control" are groundless); Benjamin Zipursky, A Theory of Punitive Damages, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1o5
(2005) (stating that empirical studies have traced the "problem" of punitive damages to a handful of
cases of unusually high awards, coming out of an isolated geographic portion of the country).
361. Siegel, supra note 99, at 1147-48.
362. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 490-91 (1993) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting, joined by White and Souter, JJ.).
363. Yoo, supra note 240.
364. See Zoller, supra note 3, at 579 (noting that "the congruence and proportionality test operates




nothing more. 6 ' The command of an eye for an eye was originally
instituted as a limitation to restrain people from over-punishing
wrongs. 6 The people's inclination in Biblical times, perhaps as now, was
to respond to wrongdoing with retribution and vengeance.6 7 The Old
Testament command was meant to restrict this impulse by instilling
remedial power solely in magistrates, and requiring them to craft
proportional responses."6
The use of a proportionality standard to restrict the inappropriate
excess of response to wrongdoing thus explains the Supreme Court's
motivation in its modern remedial proportionality cases. It views the
world as one in which remedies have crossed over to vengeance due to
the overreaching of judges into policymaking and remedial excess.
Defendants receive vengeance, rather than appropriate sanctions, by a
system run amuck with overly harsh remedies. The doctrinal rule of
proportionality is meant to restrict this retributive judicial policymaking
and misuse of discretion, limiting judicial remedies to more appropriate,
"civilized" responses.
IV. THE MYTH OF PROPORTIONALITY AND ITS ATTENDANT DANGERS
The application of the proportionality principle, however, belies the
myth of neutrality. Indeed, any utilization of the principle beyond the
theoretical necessarily implicates the very use of judicial discretion and
subjectivity the rule seeks to avoid. Beyond the misconception of
proportionality as an inherently evenhanded standard lies the risk of
danger from buying in too strongly to this rule. Proportionality as
currently applied by the Supreme Court in its strict remedial form risks
the adoption of a rule of Supreme Court judicial supremacy that elevates
the preferences of defendant wrongdoers above justice to plaintiffs. This
perversion of the remedial process into protection for the wrongdoer is a
threat to the rule of law that must be addressed.
A. THE MASK OF OBJECTIVITY
The lure of objective remedial proportionality is a mirage. The
365. See Exodus 21:23-25 (King James); Leviticus 24:18-20; Deuteronomy 19:21.
366. Ristroph, supra note 47, at 280-83 (stating that an eye for an eye or "lex talionis" is a limiting
principle on punishment): see Steven Eisenstat, Revenge, Justice and Law: Recognizing the Victim's
Desire for Vengeance as a Justification for Punishment, 5o WAYNE L. REV. I 115, 1132 (2004) (indicating
that numerous scholars have noted that the passage "an eye for an eye" imposed a proportionality
requirement in order to limit the harshness of punishment).
367. See Eisenstat, supra note 366; THE CODE OF HAMMURABI, KING OF BABYLON: ABOUT 2250 B.C.,
§§ 196-97. 199 at 73 (Robert Francis Harper trans., 2000) (19o4).
368. The New Testament command of justice raises the bar and directs the injured person to turn
the other cheek. In the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus thus raises the bar even further in demanding
forgiveness rather than proportionate response. Matthew 5:38-39; see Mary C. Szto, Lawyers as Hired
Doves: Lessons from the Sermon on the Mount. 31 CUMB. L. REv. 27, 40 (2000).
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establishment of a doctrinal rule and the identification of component
objective factors does not save the standard from subjectivity. Rather, as
some Justices and commentators have noted, proportionality remains an
inherently subjective standard.6 Professor Karlan put it succinctly:
"proportionality is both an inherently alluring and an inevitably
unsatisfactory measure of constitutionality. . . [t]he problem lies in
translating the principle into a standard for judicial oversight. For all the
Court's invocation of objective factors, it turns out that a key aspect of
proportionality review remains fundamentally subjective.""37  This
inherent subjectivity is compounded when its transparency is shrouded
by a rule that seems to require precise, objective measurement.
Subjectivity is inherent in the proportionality analysis, from the
initial framing of the question to the selection and evaluation of
qualitative factors. Justice Kennedy made this point in arguing against
the adoption of a proportionality standard for punitive damages in TXO
(though he later signed on to the proportionality standard in Gore and
State Farm):
To ask whether a particular award of punitive damages is grossly
excessive begs the question: excessive in relation to what? The answer
excessive in relation to the conduct of the tortfeasor may be correct,
but it is unhelpful, for we are still bereft of any standard by which to
compare the punishment to the malefaction that gave rise to it. A
reviewing court employing this formulation comes close to relying
upon nothing more than its own subjective reaction to a particular
punitive damages award in deciding whether the award violates the
Constitution. This type of review, far from imposing meaningful, law-
like restraints on jury excess, could become as fickle as the process it is
designed to superintend. Furthermore, it might give the illusion of
judicial certainty where none in fact exists .... 37
The objectivity of the proportionality principle is skewed from the
start by the way in which the Court frames the question. The Court must
ask whether the remedy is proportional, but proportional to what? The
ability to alter the comparison point demonstrates the manipulability of
the proportionality rule. It is this manipulability in the framing of the
proportionality question that renders the standard subjective. For
369. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 599 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("[T]he application of the Court's new rule of constitutional law is constrained by no principle other
than the Justices' subjective assessment of the 'reasonableness' of the award in relation to the conduct
for which it was assessed."); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 556 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting); TXO
Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 466-70 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); Karlan, supra note 102, at 882-83.
370. See Karlan, supra note 102, at 882-83.
37I. TXO, 509 U.S. at 466-67 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Despite these strong reservations, Kennedy eventually signed on to the objective proportionality
standard in Gore, 517 U.S. at 562, and wrote the majority opinion endorsing proportionality in State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 408 (2003).
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example, in the punitive damages context, the Court can frame the
proportionality comparison as punitives compared to compensatories,372
to actual harm,373 to potential harm,374 or to reprehensibility of the
conduct.3 75 As Justice Ginsburg noted, the result as to the validity of
punitive measures varies depending on the reframing of the question:
"By switching the focus from the ratio of punitive to compensatory
damages to the potential loss to the plaintiffs had the defendant
succeeded in its illicit scheme, the Court could describe the relevant ratio
in TXO as io to i" rather than the 526 to i achieved by comparing
punitives to actual harm.376
The framing problem was at the heart of the debate over a punitive
damages award in the recently decided Philip Morris USA v. Williams.377
The Oregon Supreme Court awarded punitive damages of $79.5 million
against Philip Morris, an amount ninety-seven times greater than the
compensatory damages awarded, because of the company's extreme
reprehensibility in defrauding consumers as to the dangers of tobacco
smoking.3"s Philip Morris argued in its briefs to the Supreme Court that
punitives should be measured solely by the mathematical ratio of
punitive to compensatory damages, as highlighted in State Farm.379 Mrs.
Williams, the widow of a man who died of lung cancer caused by
smoking, framed the proportionality issue differently; she argued that the
proportionality of the punitive award must be balanced against both the
quantitative ratio of punitive to compensatory damages and the
qualitative factor of the tobacco company's reprehensibility."5 Thus, the
proper amount of punitive damages could have turned simply on how the
proportionality question was framed, dictating the components
compared and the qualitative or quantitative nature of the inquiry. The
372. See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 424-28.
373. Id.; Gore, 517 U.S. at 58o-83; TXO, 5o9 U.S. at 475 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
374. See TXO, 5o9 U.S. at 453; see also State Farm, 538 U.S. at 423-24.
375. See Brief for Respondent at 6-9, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S.Ct. 1057 (2o07) (No.
05-1256); see also discussion supra pp. 147-48.
376. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 430 & n.I (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also St. Louis, Iron Mountain
& S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 66-67 (1919) (upholding civil penalty of seventy-five dollars
against railroad for overcharging two students sixty-six cents each). In St. Louis, the Court identified
the framing issue:
When the penalty is contrasted with the overcharge possible in any instance it of course
seems large, but, as we have said, its validity is not to be tested in that way. When it is
considered with due regard for the interests of the public, the numberless opportunities for
committing the offense, and the need for securing uniform adherence to established
passenger rates, we think it properly cannot be said to be so severe and oppressive as to be
wholly disproportioned to the offense or obviously unreasonable.
Id. at 67.
377. 127 S.Ct. 1057 (2oo7).
378. Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 127 P.3d 1165. 1182 (Or. 2oo6).
379. See Brief for Petitioner at 28, Williams, 127 S.Ct. 1057 (No. 05-1256).
38o. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 375.
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framing of the question alone would have dictated the result-a
straightforward quantitative computation would have easily concluded
that the $79.5 million award was excessive. The Supreme Court,
however, avoided the proportionality question altogether, remanding the
case on an alternative ground due to the jury's improper consideration of
the defendant's conduct towards third parties in the punitive damages
calculus."'
The framing problem is apparent in other instances of remedial
proportionality. In the context of attorney's fees, fees can be balanced
against the amount of damages, the total relief, or the "public benefit"
obtained. This was the issue in City of Riverside v. Rivera, where the
defendants argued for a strict proportionality of the fees awarded
($245,456) to damages obtained ($33,350) to invalidate the award.382 The
Court entertained a comparison of fees to total relief granted ($33,350
and no injunction), but ultimately upheld the award by framing the
question as fees compared to the public benefit obtained in the exposure
of discriminatory police misconduct.33
In the desegregation cases, the validity of the school decrees varies
by the framing of the initial question of proportionality. At times, the
desegregation cases have allowed remedies to address de facto
segregation, while at other times they have not. When the question has
been framed to include economic and housing segregation as part of the
"harm" through a series of causal links and presumptions, the remedy for
de facto segregation has been upheld.3s' When the "harm" is isolated to
include only the school's affirmative acts of segregation, then the
approved remedy has been narrowed.""5 In Jenkins, the lower court tried
to frame the scope of the harm to include white flight, arguing it was
causally linked to the segregation because when segregation was
prohibited, white residents fled to the suburbs.' 86 Accordingly, a valid
remedy could address that consequence by creating high quality magnet
schools to attract students back from the suburbs. A five-Justice majority
of the Court rejected this depiction, and reframed the question to
circumscribe the relevant harm to include only the initial segregation of
school assignments.' 7
Subjectivity thus drives the framing question as the courts decide
381. Williams, 127 S.Ct. at io62.
382. 477 U.S. 561, 564-67 (1986).
383. Id. at 574-81.
384. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton 11). 443 U.S. 526 (1979): Keyes v. School Dist. No.
1, 43 U.S. 189 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1(i97).
385. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Dayton Bd. of Ed. v. Brinkman (Dayton 1), 433 U.S.
46 977).
386. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 91-92.
387. Id. at io-o3.
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what will be placed upon the scale to balance against the remedy.
Because proportionality is an ends-means test, "how broadly or how
narrowly the Court conceptualizes the proper unit of analysis will matter
in every... case."' ' The subjective manipulation inherent in the
definition of the problem explains the widely disparate results in Lane
and Garrett as to the constitutionality of legislative remedies under
separate titles of the Americans with Disabilities Act. In Lane, the
plaintiffs' specific right at issue-that of access to the courts-was placed
within the broader context of disability discrimination in society to
conceptualize a broad problem justifying broad legislative remedies' 8 9
Garrett, in contrast, evaluated only the particular violation suffered by
the plaintiff-employment discrimination by the state-and expressly
excluded from consideration the generalized context of disability
discrimination.3" Both Lane and Garrett were five to four decisions, but
with the switch of Justice O'Connor, the remedial disability legislation
was upheld when conceptualizing the problem as one of broad, societal
harm.
In this way, the framing question undermines the alleged neutrality
of the remedial proportionality standard by significantly altering the
question that must be answered. Once the question is framed, the
remedial question of matching proportionality is relatively easy to
answer. The answer to the proportionality analysis simply depends upon
the question asked, and that question varies depending upon the eye of
the beholder. Therefore, the proportionality standard masks underlying
judicial subjectivity by feigning objectivity and neutrality. It subverts the
normative questions by making remedial decisions seem mechanical,
objective, and straightforward when they are not.
Add to this framing discretion a secondary level of subjectivity,
which enters judicial decisions by the selection of the analytical inputs for
the proportionality calculus. Subjectivity enters into the decisionmaking
as the judges select the appropriate inputs for consideration-for
example evaluating the magnitude of the harm or the reprehensibility of
the conduct. In the punitive damages context, what is "reprehensible"?39 '
The seriousness of a harm is "not a universal, timeless fact," but rather
turns upon the views of the individual judges.392 Though "dressed up as a
legal opinion, it is really no more than a disagreement with the
community's sense of indignation or outrage expressed in the punitive
388. Araiza, supra note 257, at 42 (analyzing Section 5 remedial cases).
389. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509.523-28, 533-34 (2oo4).
39
o
. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368-74 (2ooi).
391. See generally Spencer, supra note 161, at t097 & n.59 (addressing the meaning of
reprehensibility and the difficulty of comparing physical and economic harm).
392. See, e.g.. Karlan, supra note 102, at 888.
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award of the.., jury." '393 As Justice Scalia argued in Gore, judicial review
"reflects not merely a judgment about a matter of degree, but a judgment
about the appropriate degree of indignation or outrage, which is hardly
an analytical determination.... There is no precedential warrant for
giving our judgment priority over the judgment of state courts and juries
on this matter."394 Thus, as Professor Spencer put it, the "objective"
guideposts of proportionality are just as subjective as the "Takes-the-
Judicial-Breath-Away-and-Raises-the-Judicial-Eyebrows Test: all
involve the Supreme Court in making its own determinations on behalf
of an entire nation.,
395
B. DANGEROUS DEFERENCE TO THE DEFENDANTS
Remedial proportionality as currently utilized by the Supreme Court
is a defendant-friendly concept. The Court has co-opted the international
norm of proportionality as protection for victims and used it as a sword
to cut down plaintiffs' rights. It has perverted the international norm by
fashioning a rule of protection of "fundamental rights" for corporate
defendants, institutional actors, and states. 39
This pro-defendant bias has been well-documented in a series of
articles by Professor Wendy Parker examining injunctive relief in
discrimination cases.397 In tracing the Court's desegregation cases and the
resulting doctrinal rules of injunctive proportionality, Parker has seen a
shocking rule of deference to defendants at the plaintiffs' expense. 39s She
concludes: "The Supreme Court's approach to school desegregation in
particular and public law remedies in general has prevented lower court
judges from undertaking principled, well-grounded remedial processes
and has ceded too much remedial power to the defendants, the alleged or
adjudicated wrongdoer. ',31 Similarly, the cases on punitive damages
demonstrate a primary concern with the welfare of the defendant.4"' And
even the Section 5 cases align with the defendant states over the
393. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. at 559, 6oo (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
394. Id.
395. Spencer, supra note 161, at io96-97.
396. See Zoller, supra note 3, at 569, 585 (noting that the Court most often has used the
proportionality principle in the Section 5 cases to protect the rights of states, rather than for the
benefit of individuals).
397. Parker, supra note 181, at 479; Wendy Parker, Connecting the Dots: Grutter, School
Desegregation, and Federalism, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1691, 1694-95 (2004); Wendy Parker, Lessons
in Losing: Race Discrimination in Employment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 889, 893 (2oo6) ("Courts are
doing more than deferring to defendants; they are actually agreeing with the defendants.").
398. Parker, supra note 181, at 479; Wendy Parker, The Decline of Judicial Decisionmaking: School
Desegregation and District Court Judges, 8i N.C. L. REV. 1623, 1657 (2003) [hereinafter Parker,
Judicial Decisionmaking].
399. Parker, supra note 181, at 479.
400. See discussion supra pp. 123-24.
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individual victims or the people's protectors in Congress.4"'
The Supreme Court's pro-defendant remedial bias is dangerous in
two respects. First, it fails to create the incentives necessary to alter
illegal behavior. If defendants control the remedies, and courts must
abide by the defendants' interests in crafting remedies, then there is less
incentive to change illegal behavior. Justice O'Connor recognized this
pitfall in Ayotte where she acknowledged the potential invitation to state
legislatures to carelessly legislate and leave it to the courts to sort out.
Similarly, in the punitive damages context, the remedial proportionality
rule encourages careless behavior by potential wrongdoers.4"2 A
proportionality rule in which defendants receive relatively insubstantial
penalties "will be viewed simply as a tolerable cost of a certain course of
action, provided the ultimate benefits to be gained outweigh that cost."4 3
Thus, it will likely "influence the tortfeasor's rational-cost minimizing
choice with respect to the utilization of reasonable and/or reprehensible
input activities. If the price of reprehensible input activities decreases
relative to the price of reasonable input activities, then one can anticipate
an increase in such reprehensible activities."44
Second, the pro-defendant remedial bias skews the supposed
balance of rights inherent in proportionality by prioritizing defendants'
rights at the expense of plaintiffs.4 "5 Missing from these cases is any
concern for when plaintiffs are accorded too little relief.4°6 For example,
the Supreme Court does not strictly review motions for additur of
punitive damages or enhance punitive damage awards to address the fact
that a pay-your-own attorney fee system leaves the injured plaintiff less
than fully compensated. In other words, proportionality is not a two-way
street. The Court appears unconcerned with disproportionality that
harms plaintiffs.
Therefore, there is a significant cost associated with this pro-
40. Zoller, supra note 3, at 569, 584 ("Against the [international norm of proportionality], it
looks, indeed as if the Court discovered that states too had rights just like individuals, that they could
be abused just like the latter, and that their 'fundamental rights' ought to be guaranteed by the same
principle of congruence and proportionality that protects human rights.").
402. Marshall & Fitzgerald, supra note 128, at 257.
403. Spencer, supra note I61, at sioi.
404. Marshall & Fitzgerald, supra note 128, at 257.
405. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 101-02 (John Ladd trans.,
Bobbs-Merrill 1965) (797) ("What kind and what degree of punishment does public legal justice
adopt as its principle and standard? None other than the principle of equality (illustrated by the
pointer on the scales of justice), that is, the principle of not treating one side more favorably than the
other."); ARISTOTLE, supra note 54, at 87 (stating that each side had what is justly theirs "whenever
neither more nor less results").
4o6. For an argument that due process requires a minimum amount of adequate relief to injured
plaintiffs, see Thomas, supra note 164, and Tracy A. Thomas. Ubi Jus, lbi Remedium: The
Fundamental Right to an Adequate Remedy, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1633 (2003).
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defendant rule: the very real risk of under-enforcement of the law.4" The
result may have some appeal to Justices who believe that the legal system
has run amok and that certain remedies, like structural injunctions and
punitive damages, should not in fact be enforced. But the real cost is to
plaintiffs and to the legal system. Plaintiffs have the burden of initiating
lawsuits, and incentives to do so have been lessened. As between the two
parties in the lawsuit, where remedial measures are at issue, the plaintiff
is the one who has suffered harm, and the defendant the wrongdoer.
Tipping the balance in favor of the defendant signals that plaintiffs, and
the laws that protect them, are not important.
C. UNVEILING PROPORTIONALITY AS JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
By now it should be apparent that the remedial proportionality
principle is not a rule of minimalism, but rather a rule of judicial
activism. The Supreme Court is not taking the path of least resistance in
these cases, but instead is actively engaged in policymaking to displace
the traditional remedial process. The evidence speaks for itself. The
quest for a rule of objectivity has in fact widened the doors for
subjectivity. Claims of minimalism and modesty have produced activism.
And the cry for restraint has resulted in the active overturning of
carefully crafted remedies.
This Article's revelation of the operation of remedial proportionality
in the Supreme Court cases supports the conclusion of others that this is
one of the most activist Courts in history.4°8 Remedial proportionality
establishes a rule of judicial supremacy in which the Court strikes down
remedies with which it disagrees and enacts remedial reform that could
not pass the legislative branches.4" Proportionality becomes the doctrinal
mechanism by which the Supreme Court activates its judicial supremacy.
Ironically, while proportionality was intended as a rule to curb the
407. Parker, Judicial Decisionmaking, supra note 398, at 1657. Professor Parker notes:
[The district court judges] are willing to let the parties, particularly the defendants, control
the process and outcome of these lawsuits. While this posture may allay some of the
criticisms of the power of judges in school desegregation, the judges' deference to
defendants has come at the cost of plaintiffs' right to desegregation to the extent practicable
and, at times, at the cost of less than full compliance with Supreme Court precedent.
Id.
408. See THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE ROAD TO MODERN
JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM (2004); THE REHNQUIST COURT: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON THE RIGHT (Herman
Schwartz ed., 2002); Larry D. Kramer, Op-Ed., No Surprise. It's an Activist Court, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12,
2000, at A33 (contending that "conservative judicial activism is the order of the day"): Cass R.
Sunstein, Op-Ed., Tilting the Scales Rightward, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2001, at A23 (stating that "[w]e
are now in the midst of a remarkable period of right-wing judicial activism" on the Rehnquist Court).
409. See Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 8o, 83 & n.ll
(2ooi) (describing the "crystal ball" of Section 5 proportionality that supports the Court's judicial
activism of striking down acts of Congress); Spencer, supra note 161, at io9O (arguing that many would
call proportionality in punitives "'judicial activism" except that those who usually assail claims of
activism politically agree with the result of punitives in the name of tort reform).
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alleged judicial activism of the lower court exercising broad remedial
power and issuing broad rulings, proportionality has now transferred that
activist potential to the highest court in the land. 4 0
At some level, the term "judicial activism" is merely an epithet that
can be hurled at any court decision with which the accuser disagrees."'
Justice Ginsburg stated during her confirmation hearings that judicial
activism is "a label too often pressed into service by critics of court
results rather than the legitimacy of court decisions."4 '2 Conservatives
have used the term to attack public law injunctions in schools and
prisons, while liberals have used the epithet to attack judicial
invalidations of social legislation.1 3 However, the judicial activism of
proportionality analysis is more than a simple disagreement over the
content of the result."4 The activism results from the displacement of the
usual, centuries-old process of remedial judicial decisionmaking by a new
higher Court supremacy. Such displacement of long-accepted judicial
process of crafting remedies is the essence of judicial activism.415
As demonstrated, proportionality analysis does not produce a
rational, restrained rule of judicial remedies. Instead, it replaces the
normal remedial functioning of the judicial process with a subjective rule
of Supreme Court supremacy that gives the Court the singular power to
determine remedies.
CONCLUSION: RESTORING DEFERENTIAL REVIEW OF REMEDIES
The open question is whether this trend toward heightened scrutiny
of remedial decisions through the use of a proportionality standard will
continue. Virtually every member of the Court has advanced the cause of
proportionality in one context or another. The acceptance of the
proportionality standard seems to cut across jurisprudential lines and
political sides, making it likely that such a standard will survive in the
410. See Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1139,
1154-56 (2002) (describing "remedial activism" of both the lower courts issuing broad, invasive
remedies and the Supreme Court in striking down structural injunctions and crafting its own broad
remedy in Bush v. Gore).
411. Frank B. Cross & Stefanie A. Lindquist, The Scientific Study of Judicial Activism, 91 MINN. L.
REV. 1752, 1752-1758 (describing how the term "judicial activism" is often a rhetorical tool or
"ideological harangue" used by both liberals and conservatives to attack decisions with which they
politically disagree); Young supra note 41o, at 1141.
412. Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 1o3d Cong., ist Sess. 169-71 (1993).
413. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 131-35 (995) (Thomas, J., concurring); Cross &
Lindquist, supra note 411, at I755-56.
414. Donald H. Zeigler, The New Activist Court, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1367, 1367-68 (j996) ("When
most people use the phrase, however, they are referring to how a court decides cases. They are talking
about process more than result.").
415. See Cross & Lindquist, supra note 415, at I763-68; Keenan D. Kmiec, The Origin and Current
Meaning of "Judicial Activism," 92 CAL. L. REV. 1441, I473 (2004).
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near future.' 6 Yet, Justice O'Connor was a driving force in many of the
key remedial cases of the modern Court, and her absence may portend a
change in the remedial winds. It may also be that Justice Scalia's
rejection of proportionality in both the civil and criminal contexts will
garner additional support from the newest members of the Court.
Armed with a more transparent understanding of remedial
proportionality and its false promises, legal scholars and jurists can begin
to shake the belief in proportionality as an absolute measure of
objectivity. The focus of this Article has been to debunk the assumed
validity of proportionality by deconstructing the rule and its strict
application by the Court. It does not conclude, however, without offering
a recommendation for the future. For as Elisabeth Zoller argues, the
proportionality test "is a legal tool that is neutral in itself .... [Ilt can be
good or evil, depending on the use that is made of it.... The problem is
to learn how to use it."
'4' 7
The courts need to retain the ability to check for excessive remedies
through the process of deferential judicial review. Justice Scalia's
rejection of all remedial oversight risks would prevent the Court from
being able to capture remedial outliers that deserve the Court's disfavor,
such as public school planetariums or $175 million awards for emotional
distress unaccompanied by personal injury. If reviewing courts stop
asking what remedy is "just right," and instead look only for remedies
that are "grossly excessive," the range of consensus is likely to increase
as to what is in fact too extreme. While the range of appropriate relief on
the remedial spectrum is vast, the spectrum's extremes are more clear.
Judgments about the relative excessiveness of remedies are far more
consistent than determinations of the absolute measure of precise
remedial response."' The relative consensus dilutes the impact of the
inherent subjectivity of the standard by addressing the extremes upon
which most reasonable people can agree, rather than turning on the
personal views of a few individual judges.
Rejecting strict proportionality in favor of deferential judicial review
is the doctrinal path taken by the Supreme Court in the criminal
proportionality cases. After several decades of experience with a strict
proportionality standard in the criminal sentencing context, a majority of
416. Siegel, supra note 99, at 1126 ("[I]t is increasingly clear that the operative principle behind the
Court's remedial hostility is not bluntly or categorically political.").
417. Zoller, supra note 3, at 570-71.
48. Cf Alice Ristroph, Desert, Democracy, and Sentencing Reform, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1293, 1303 (2OO6) (examining empirical studies in the criminal sentencing context that "have found a
substantial degree of consensus about the relative severity of different offenses, even in the face of
disagreement over 'the absolute level of punishment' (the precise sentence that should be imposed for
a given offense)" (citation omitted)).
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the Court has rejected it.4"9 Instead, the Court has adopted a relatively
deferential principle of "narrow" proportionality under the Eighth
Amendment. 4" This weak standard of "gross disproportionality"
examines sentences only to see if they are extreme, rather than carefully
calibrated, and is reserved for the rare case.42' Under this standard, the
Court has upheld most of the sentences it has reviewed.422 The Court's
experience with proportionality weighs in favor of such weak-form
review under which the gross disproportionality standard captures
extreme cases.
Restoring the traditional standard of deference to remedial arbiters
neutralizes the increasing activism of the Court. Deferential review
would mean the end of de novo appellate review of remedies and the
return to a respect of judges and juries crafting remedies. There is a
sound basis for a rule of deference in determining the proper measure of
relief because the factfinder is closer to the observed "truth" and facts.
Judicial policymaking is minimized by tying the decision more closely to
the facts or circumstances narrowly presented by each case.
Thus, this Article ultimately suggests restoring remedial
proportionality analysis to its traditional place as a tool of judicial review
that is used sparingly to guide remedial decisions. Returning to a
moderate use of proportionality-call it narrow, or weak, or
reasonable-employs proportionality only as an outer check upon
potentially aberrant awards that go beyond the pale. The deference
solution, in other words, is an argument in favor of the way we were.
419. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003); Pillai, supra note 259, at 662-66, 665 n.ii5. The
Court has retained strict proportionality review for death penalty cases.
420. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72; Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. It, 20 (2003) (plurality opinion); United
States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 336-37 (1998).
421. See Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 73; Harmelin v. Michigan, 5o U.S- 957, 1001 (199).
422. See Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 64 (upholding sentence of twenty-five years to life for three-time
recidivist stealing $15o worth of videos); Ewing, 538 at 25-28 (upholding sentence of twenty-five years
to life for three-time recidivist stealing three golf clubs). But see Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 334 (striking
down fine of $357,144, the full amount of cash defendant failed to declare when leaving the country as
grossly disproportionate in light of statutory fine of $5,000); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983)
(striking down sentence of life in prison for petty criminal with six prior minor felonies for writing bad
check for $Ioo).
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